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Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry
Doug Keller*
This Article traces the history of two federal immigration crimes that
have long supplemented the civil immigration system and now make up
nearly half of all federal prosecutions: illegal entry and illegal re-entry.
Little has been previously written about the historical lineage of either
crime, despite the supporting role each has played in enforcing the
nation’s civil immigration laws, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico
border. This Article takes a critical look at the enforcement of each
crime—from when they were initially conceived of as a way to deter
illegal immigration, then as a way to target dangerous aliens, and most
recently as a means to do both. These shifting strategies, however, have
one thing in common: ineffectiveness. Enforcing the crimes has never
meaningfully deterred illegal immigration, and the government’s poorly
designed proxy to determine whether an alien is “dangerous” has
ensured that prosecutions have not made the public safer. The most
recent period is particularly troubling—enforcement has led to
approximately 72,000 combined prosecutions a year, at the cost of well
over a billion dollars a year, and at the expense of prosecuting more
serious crimes. Despite these huge costs and the related human
carnage, the criminalization of illegal entry and re-entry is invariably
left out of the discussion of comprehensive immigration reform, which
reflects the silent treatment these crimes have received in the
immigration and criminal law literature more generally. By reviewing
eight decades of ineffective policy, this Article makes the case for why
there should be a fundamental re-thinking concerning the way in which
the United States uses the criminal justice system to regulate
immigration.
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INTRODUCTION
Finding common ground in the debate on comprehensive
immigration reform in the United States remains elusive. But
politicians apparently agree on one issue: the appropriateness of using
the criminal justice system—rather than merely the civil immigration
system—to regulate illegal entry (entering the United States without
legal permission) and illegal re-entry (entering the United States after
having been deported). 1 Conversations about reform have simply not
included talk about the enforcement of these crimes. This silent
treatment mirrors the lack of attention these crimes typically receive in
academic literature on both immigration law and criminal law more
generally. 2
The crimes of illegal entry and re-entry deserve more attention. With
72,000 combined convictions in 2011, almost half of all federal
prosecutions are now for illegal entry or re-entry, 3 a stunning and
mostly unnoticed development in the federal criminal justice system.
The prosecutions occur almost exclusively in districts along the U.S.Mexico border, where they have been nothing short of cataclysmic for
the administration of justice. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and court
personnel are overwhelmed by a tidal wave of cases. The District Court
of Arizona, for example, was driven to declare a judicial emergency—
the first time any district has been forced to do so in almost three
decades. 4 To support the huge caseloads, many border districts have
turned federal criminal proceedings into something unrecognizable as
1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1952) (illegal entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1952) (illegal re-entry).
2. As Professor Ingrid Eagly notes in one of the few articles to grapple with the issues
surrounding the government’s newfound vigor for prosecuting immigration cases:
Criminal law scholars have typically overlooked immigration crime in their study of
federal criminal law. In part, this omission reflects the tendency to treat white collar
crime as the paradigmatic example of federal prosecution. Immigration law scholars,
in contrast, have traditionally explored civil regulatory questions of admission,
exclusion, and removal, and largely ignored the criminal arm of the immigration
bureaucracy. A nascent body of literature has begun to document the increasing
merger of the immigration and criminal systems, yet such analysis has focused on how
the federal immigration agency imposes quasi-criminal sanctions in a setting that skirts
criminal constitutional rights.
Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2010) (footnotes
omitted). See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration through Crime, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/135
_Chacon.pdf (discussing some of the issues surrounding the government’s use of the criminal
justice system to regulate immigration and listing the literature on the subject).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 345–48 (providing annual statistics for prosecutions).
4. In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 971–75 (9th
Cir. 2011) (granting the District of Arizona’s request to declare a judicial emergency and noting
the “crushing criminal caseload”).
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such: immigration officials, instead of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, now
prosecute defendants, and defendants often meet with their attorneys for
mere minutes before pleading guilty—alongside dozens of other
defendants—in front of magistrate judges. 5 The government has also
diverted resources from prosecuting more serious crimes and now
spends well over one billion dollars a year, mostly on incarceration
costs, on these cases. 6 This colossal investment, however, is neither
deterring illegal immigration nor making the public safer—the two
claimed objectives of the prosecutions. 7
This Article contends that policymakers and scholars need to start
paying more attention to these crimes and their enforcement. In making
that case, this Article reviews eight decades of ineffective enforcement
efforts of these immigration crimes—crimes that have quietly become a
significant aspect of immigration enforcement. More specifically, this
Article critically examines the shifting purposes the government has
cited to justify prosecuting illegal entrants and re-entrants rather than
merely sending them through the civil immigration system—from when
prosecutions were initially conceived of as a way to deter illegal
immigration, then as a way to target dangerous aliens, and most
recently, as a means to do both. This Article’s central claim is that
prosecuting illegal entrants and re-entrants has not meaningfully
fulfilled either penological goal. This failure should initiate a
fundamental re-thinking of the wisdom of using the criminal justice
system as a tool to regulate immigration through the prosecution of
illegal entry and re-entry cases.
Part I of this Article tracks the first stage (1929 through 1986) of the
journey to the current policy mess and the rise of the claim that
prosecuting illegal entrants and re-entrants could deter illegal
immigration from Mexico. Part I also documents the birth of various
aspects of policy that play an important role in enforcing the crimes
today. Part I begins by discussing Congress’s creation of the modern
versions of both crimes in 1929 to combat illegal immigration along the
border. But, of the hundreds of thousands of individuals apprehended
for illegal entry or re-entry, no more than 10,000 a year were
prosecuted, ensuring that the threat of prosecution was unlikely to
meaningfully deter individuals from coming to the United States
illegally. Ineffective deterrence, however, was likely the point. Given
5. See infra text accompanying notes 339–43 (discussing the procedures used in current
immigration prosecutions).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 365–66 (noting that the detention cost for illegal re-entry
defendants alone is around $750 million annually).
7. See infra Part III (discussing the failure of current prosecution policy).
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the importance of illegal immigration to the nation’s economic engine,
immigration officials undoubtedly did not want to actually discourage
it. 8
Part II covers the evolution of the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry
from 1987 through 2004, highlighting the dramatic shift in strategy
behind prosecuting these cases. No longer were the crimes considered
tools to deter illegal immigration per se; rather, prosecuting such cases
came to be viewed as a way to protect the public from dangerous aliens
who came illegally to the United States to commit crimes. 9 This Part
describes the government’s terrible proxy—the “prior conviction
enhancement scheme”—which was created to determine whether an
alien was dangerous. The proxy could deem aliens dangerous based on
a single, non-violent prior conviction, which could have occurred
decades prior. 10 Thus, many individuals were labeled dangerous who
were not.
Nevertheless, such individuals were targeted for
prosecution—both to specifically deter them from coming to the United
States and to incapacitate them—and many were given harsh sentences
for non-violent, regulatory offenses.
Part II also follows the rise in the number of prosecutions of illegal
entry and re-entry cases to around 20,000 a year, most of which occur
along the U.S.-Mexico border. 11 This rise in prosecutions was made
possible because of the “fast track” program, a special type of plea
program whereby some illegal entry and re-entry defendants could
receive a discounted sentence if they agreed to waive their rights and
plead guilty quickly. 12 While the program mitigated otherwise harsh
penalties, it raised its own set of questions, particularly because the
program was not evenly applied throughout the country. 13 The program

8. The history discussed in Part I is, in some ways, a familiar one. A number of scholars have
traced the progression of immigration enforcement in the United States, which inevitably requires
the spotlight to shine on the U.S.-Mexico border. These scholars have focused on civil
enforcement—the ebb and flow of deportations and grants of voluntary departure. Enforcing the
criminal prohibition against illegal entry and re-entry, however, is rarely mentioned. When
mentioned, it is merely as an aside. One goal of this Part is to add an additional layer to a picture
that other scholars have already painted, creating a more detailed depiction of the government’s
historical efforts to regulate immigration.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 215–19 (discussing the Department of Justice’s shift
toward prosecuting illegal entrants and re-entrants with prior criminal histories).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 241–44 (discussing the low standard for what qualified
a defendant as “dangerous” under the prior-conviction enhancement scheme).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 293–97 (noting the rise in the number of prosecutions
between 2001 and 2004).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 225–34 (discussing the procedures implemented by the
fast-track program and the reason the program was created).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 256–72 (discussing the wide differences in how district
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also further opened the door to the idea that it was appropriate to
drastically cut, for the sake of a more efficient guilty-plea process, the
amount of process a federal criminal defendant could receive—an idea
on which the government now heavily relies.
Part III documents the final period of illegal entry and re-entry
prosecutions from 2005 to the present day, and the 72,000 combined
prosecutions per year that are overwhelming border districts. This most
recent period has witnessed the marriage of the worst aspects of prior
periods—the belief that prosecuting cases can deter illegal immigration
along the U.S.-Mexico border and that the prior-conviction scheme can
be used to target particularly dangerous individuals for heightened
sentences. This Part explores why neither goal has been met—despite
the explosion in prosecutions—and the consequences of pursuing what
appears to be a self-destructive strategy.
The Article concludes with parting thoughts on where the
government’s illegal entry and re-entry prosecution strategy might go
from here. Ultimately, the prognosis is that conditions will likely get
much worse before they improve.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP: THE INEFFECTIVE ATTEMPT TO DETER
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION (1929–1986)
The long opening chapter of the story of the crimes of illegal entry
and re-entry covers the years 1929 through 1986. In reviewing this
period, this Part places each crime in the broader context of the
evolution of U.S. immigration policy. But given the complexity of that
policy, the provided context is far from exhaustive. Nevertheless,
reviewing each crime in the long shadow of civil immigration
enforcement, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border, reveals that
each crime played a supporting role in enforcing U.S. immigration
law—a role that scholars have previously ignored. 14 As explained
courts across the country applied the fast-track program and the difficulty in mounting a defense
against prosecution under the program).
14. Historical accounts of the crimes are brief and often inaccurate. For example, the most
“thorough analysis” concerning the history of illegal re-entry as a crime has been credited to a
Judge Posner dissent, which, in its few paragraphs treatment of the issue, gets the history
wrong—albeit benignly—by claiming that a 1918 law is the “origin[]” of the crime. See Brent S.
Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders
in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry after St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 457 (2005) (citing
United States v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1020 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
Predecessor illegal re-entry provisions were enacted in 1798 and 1910. See infra notes 27 and 28.
Likewise, a common—but incorrect—assumption about the crimes is that they were not enforced
before the mid 1990s and that no more than a couple thousand individuals were prosecuted for
either crime in any given year before then. For example, a 2004 U.S. Sentencing Commission
report stated that before 1994, “there were relatively few immigration cases sentenced in the
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below, just as Congress began to perceive that illegal immigration from
Mexico was a threat, it criminalized illegal entry and re-entry. In this
new battle, Congress viewed these crimes as powerful weapons to deter
illegal immigration. From the beginning, however, intractable problems
made achieving deterrence unlikely. Moreover, as illegal immigration
exponentially increased to satisfy the nation’s need for cheap labor, the
number of prosecutions failed to keep pace. Consequently, despite
rhetoric from immigration officials about using the criminal justice
system to discourage illegal immigration, only a tiny fraction of illegal
entrants and re-entrants were prosecuted. This stance reflected the
paradox at the center of U.S. immigration policy throughout the
century: the purported desire of the United States to reduce illegal
Mexican immigration, while at the same time not wanting to discourage
it for fear of stalling the country’s economic engine. This enigmatic
relationship thus resulted in the arbitrary prosecution of a select few,
ensuring that prosecutions did not deter illegal immigration. The result
was that criminalizing illegal entry and re-entry did not fulfill its
articulated purpose.
A. Early Illegal Entry and Re-entry Policy (1929–1951)
The account of the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry begins in 1929
when Congress began to flex its immigration-regulation muscles.
While the United States essentially had open borders for most of the
nineteenth century, Congress spent the first few decades of the twentieth
century creating an ever-growing list of classes of individuals who were
barred entry into the United States and subsequently subject to
deportation if they entered. 15 This period also reflected a shift in
federal courts,” and noted that there were no more than a couple thousand prosecutions annually
in the early 1990s, which contrasted with the late 1990s when each year averaged almost 10,000
prosecutions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING, at viii
(Nov. 2004). As discussed below, however, there were over 10,000 illegal entry and re-entry
prosecutions combined per year in the early 1950s and the late 1970s.
15. See generally E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY, 1798–1965, at 47–213 (1981) (summarizing all immigration legislation enacted between
1860 and 1929); see also Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (making
deportable anyone who was excludable to begin with). Among Congress’s most notable efforts
to restrict immigration occurred in 1921 and 1924, when it established quantitative restrictions on
who could immigrate to the United States based on national origin and race. See Quota Act of
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5; Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch.
190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159 (discussing the 1924 Act and stating that it “fundamentally altered
the landscape of U.S. immigration law and policy”). Those restrictions had the effect of
curtailing European immigration, as countries from the Western Hemisphere—including
Mexico—were exempted from the quotas. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 50 (2004). In 1924, pursuant to the Act of May
28, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-153, ch. 204, 43 Stat. 240, Congress also created the Border Patrol and
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thinking about illegal immigration as a problem stemming from Mexico
rather than from Asia and Europe. As noted historian Mae Ngai
explained, “[I]mmigration policy [during this period] rearticulated the
U.S.-Mexico border as a cultural and racial boundary, as a creator of
illegal immigration. Federal officials self-consciously understood their
task as creating a barrier where, in a practical sense, none had existed
before.” 16
This shift in thinking included the belief that the strong hand of the
criminal law had a part to play in the U.S.-Mexico immigration battle.
As a result, Congress passed legislation in 1929 that reconceptualized
the relationship between immigration law and criminal law by fusing
the two and laying the groundwork for the modern crimes of illegal
entry and re-entry. 17 In doing so, Congress wedded the crimes with the
goal of deterring illegal immigration from Mexico.
One portion of the 1929 legislation made unlawful entry or attempted
entry into the United States misdemeanors, punishable by up to a year in
jail. 18 According to legislative history, Congress enacted the new
offense to help immigration officials with “enforcement of the law,”
particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border, 19 and as an extra deterrent to
prevent non-citizens from attempting to enter the United States
provided it a small budget and approximately 450 officers. See PETER ANDREAS, BORDER
GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 32–33 (2000). This made it at least nominally more
difficult to sneak into the country via the land border. See Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol
Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L
L.J. 1, 33–34 (2001) (summarizing the history of exclusionary immigration laws and the creation
of the Border Patrol).
16. NGAI, supra note 15, at 67.
17. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1837 (2007) (noting that the 1929 law was a
“new mechanism” to enforce a “new policy” on immigration); Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career
of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–
1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 76 (2003) (“The criminalization of unauthorized entry signaled a
radical departure from previous immigration policy, which deemed deportation to be a civil, or
administrative, procedure.”); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683,
1717 (2009) (“The 1929 legislation pioneered the modern immigration sanctions scheme,
employing a range of punitive criminal sanctions paired with deportation.”).
18. See Act of March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 180 (1929 sup. III)) (“Any alien who hereafter enters the United States at any time or
place other than as designated by immigration officials, or obtains entry to the United States by a
willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”).
Under the then-prevailing sentencing regime (which lasted until 1987), a judge had complete
discretion to select a sentence anywhere from probation to the statutory-maximum penalty. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (explaining the sentencing process before
1987).
19. Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 70th Cong. 28 (1928).
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“surreptitiously.” 20 Thanks to the legislation, for the first time in U.S.
history, the mere act of entering the United States at a non-designated
port of entry was a crime, rather than merely a civil offense resulting in
deportation. The unlawful entry provision, however, was not entirely
without precedent. Under the Passport Act of 1918 (passed at the tail
end of World War I), Congress gave the President the authority to
restrict the entry of non-citizens into the country “when the United
States is at war”; failure to abide by those restrictions could result in
prosecution and a sentence of up to twenty years. 21 Relying on this
authority, the President required aliens to present a passport to obtain
entry into the United States. 22 Thus, “persons entering illegally and
found . . . to be without passports were liable to be prosecuted as well as
deported.” 23 In effect, the law targeted individuals trying to sneak into
the United States. 24 The Passport Act was used for several years along
the border until courts held that legislation passed in 1921 rendered the
Passport Act “inoperative and ineffectual.” 25 Congress intended the
1929 unlawful entry prohibition to reinvigorate the practice that had
developed under the Passport Act, albeit by expanding the practice such
that any unlawful entry (with or without a passport) could be subject to
prosecution. 26
In another portion of the 1929 legislation, Congress created an illegal
re-entry provision—the third of the century. 27 Earlier illegal re-entry
20. H.R. REP. NO. 70-2418, at 8 (1929).
21. Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559. See Eagly, supra note 2, at
1296–97 (drawing this same connection).
22. See Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 336 (8th Cir. 1925) (documenting the President’s use of
the powers granted to him by the Passport Act of 1918).
23. JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE
266 (1969).
24. Id. at 265–66.
25. See United States v. One Airplane, 23 F.2d 500 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (“[S]ubsequent
legislation has supplanted the penal and forfeiture provisions of said War-Time Passport Act of
1918 so as to render such provisions inoperative and ineffectual.” (citation omitted)); CLARK,
supra note 23, at 266 (citing Flora, 8 F.2d at 337) (discussing how the court found that criminal
prosecution of illegal immigration under the Passport Act was unlawful and that deportation was
the proper procedure). See also Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 70th Cong. 28 (1928) (immigration official noting that a “circuit court of appeal
decision recently [knocked]” out the provision of the Passport Act that had been used to prosecute
unlawful enterers and, responding to the proposed language that would become the unlawful
entry provision by stating that it would be helpful because “[t]he more teeth you put into the law
that way, the better it is for enforcement”).
26. See CLARK, supra note 23, at 267 (“[T]he war-time ‘passport act’ has not only been
revived by the [1929 unlawful entry provision,] but also extended [it], for now any illegal entry,
whether with or without passport is a punishable offense.”).
27. The only pre-1900 federal illegal re-entry provision was enacted in 1798, when Congress
passed the Aliens Act, which empowered the President to expel any non-citizen from the country
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laws targeted a narrow group of illegal re-entrants: a 1910 law had
made it a misdemeanor to “attempt . . . to return to or enter the United
States” after having been deported for involvement in the prostitution
trade, 28 and a 1918 law had made it a felony to “return or to enter the
United States or attempt to return to or to enter the United States” after
having been deported for being an “anarchist.” 29 The effect of the two
prior illegal re-entry provisions, however, did not extend beyond their
symbolic value of congressional concern about prostitution and
anarchism. Neither affected the actual administration of immigration
policy as the government did not meaningfully enforce either provision
and both statutes were ultimately repealed in 1952. 30 Unlike those two
if such action was necessary to protect the public. See Aliens Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1
Stat. 570. The Act, among other things, made it a crime for individuals to “voluntarily return[]”
to the United States if they had been “removed or sent out of the United States by the President.”
Id. Once convicted, imprisonment would last as “long as, in the opinion of the President, the
public safety may require.” Id. However, no one was ever actually convicted under the
provision. See Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitution: The First Deportation Law, 10
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 63, 105–10 (2002) (telling the story of the lone individual ordered
deported under the Aliens Act). Controversy immediately surrounded the Act’s grant of power,
and, two years after its enactment, Congress allowed it to expire. Id. at 76–80.
28. Act of March 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 3, 36 Stat. 264, 264–65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 138
(1926)). A violation was punishable by up to two years in jail. Id. Despite the relative novelty
of making it a crime to illegally re-enter, the legislative history contains no discussion of the
provision. It appears, however, that the crime was more a statement about prevailing attitudes
regarding the wickedness of prostitution, rather than immigration policy; the illegal re-entry ban
was passed during a period of “antiprostitution fever.” See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy,
Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 714 (2005)
(noting the “antiprostitution fever” of the first decades of the twentieth century and summarizing
various laws passed in response).
29. Act of October 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 61-107, ch. 186, § 3, 40 Stat. 1012–13 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 137(h) (1926)). A violation was punishable by up to five years in prison. Id. The only
light shed on Congress’s thought process emerged during a floor statement, when a supporter of
the bill commented that the criminal provision was needed to keep individuals from returning “ad
infinitum,” thereby explicitly linking the crime of illegal re-entry to the idea of deterrence for the
first time. See 56 CONG. REC. 8109 (1918) (statement of Rep. Burnett). Just as the 1910 illegal
re-entry provision was passed during a heightened period of concern about prostitution, the 1918
anarchist illegal re-entry provision was passed during the period of heightened concern about
anarchism that followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. See Mary E. Fairhurst &
Andrew T. Braff, William O. Douglas: The Gadfly of Washington, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 259, 275
(2005) (noting that the 1917 Alien Act and 1918 Sedition Act were passed in response to the first
Red Scare). Thus, the anarchist provision likely reflected concerns about anarchism and the
anxiety surrounding the Red Scare, rather than reflecting a shift in the thinking about how to deal
with illegal re-entrants.
30. Typically no more than a few hundred individuals each year were deported for
prostitution. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE tbl.33 (1954) (documenting the small number of individuals deported
for being part of the “immoral class” from 1908 through 1954). Less than one hundred a year
were typically deported for anarchist-related conduct. See id. (documenting the small number of
individuals deported for being “subversive” or being an “anarchist” from 1908 through 1954). Of
those who returned, there does not appear to be evidence that more than a tiny number were
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provisions, the 1929 illegal re-entry provision was not limited to certain
classes of previously deported individuals. Rather, the legislation made
it a felony, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a non-citizen to
“enter or attempt[] to enter the United States” after having been
“deported in pursuance of law.” 31 The need for the illegal re-entry
provision, according to a House Report, was to address the “serious
situation[,] particularly on [U.S.] land borders, whereby people deported
to contiguous countries turn around and come back again without
further penalty than exclusion or another deportation.” 32 Another
congressional report quoted a letter from the Secretary of Labor (then in
charge of immigration), 33 and, in defending the need for the crime of
illegal re-entry, stated:
[N]o prohibitive law can successfully be enforced without a deterrent
penalty. The fact that possible deportation is not a sufficient deterrent
to discourage those who seek to gain entry through other-than-regular
channels is demonstrated by the frequency with which this department
is compelled to resort to deportation proceedings for the same alien on
several succeeding occasions. 34

Thus, Congress’s articulated motive in creating the crime was to deter
individuals from returning to the United States illegally by providing an
additional disincentive beyond deportation.
Immigration officials quickly adjusted to their new weapons in an

prosecuted under either provision before each was repealed in 1952. For example, a 1930
government report documented that only one individual over the past year had been prosecuted
for illegally re-entering the country after having been deported for being an anarchist—and that
prosecution was dismissed. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 21 (1930). There also appears to be only one reported decision
involving a prosecution of a defendant who illegally re-entered under either section. See Mills v.
United States, 273 F. 625, 626–28 (9th Cir. 1921) (affirming the conviction of a defendant for
attempting to return to the United States after having been deported for being “connected with the
management of a house of prostitution”).
31. Act of March 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 1, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 180(a)
(1929 sup. III)).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 70-2418, at 6 (1929). See Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Immigration
and Naturalization, 70th Cong. 27 (1928) (stating, in the context of discussing what would
become the 1929 legislation with an immigration official who worked at the U.S.-Mexico border,
that “[a] clause in here to the effect that aliens who are deported and attempt to enter again, that
that shall be a felony, and they will be imprisoned. Now, you have a lot of trouble down there
with these men that you push out of the country coming right back in again, do you not?”).
33. See Lauren S. Sasser, Waiting in Immigration Limbo: The Federal Court Split over Suits
to Compel Action on Stalled Adjustment of Status Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511,
2513–14 (2008) (“The Treasury Department administered immigration law until 1903, when
those duties were transferred to what would become the Department of Labor. In 1940, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—as it had been known since 1933—was moved to
the Department of Justice (DOJ), where it stayed for more than sixty years.” (footnotes omitted)).
34. S. REP. NO. 70-1456, at 2 (1929).
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attempt to deter illegal immigration. The government prosecuted
hundreds of individuals within a few months after the 1929 legislation
took effect. 35 That trend continued during 1930; according to one
report, the government secured almost 7000 combined convictions for
illegal entry and re-entry during 1930. 36 This number represented a
high percentage of the nearly 21,000 deportable aliens apprehended
during the year, most of whom could have been prosecuted for illegal
entry or re-entry. 37 In light of the number of prosecutions, the report,
echoing earlier sentiments about deterrence, stated that this prosecution
effort “will provide an effective deterrent and that, as knowledge of its
existence becomes more widespread, violations will diminish.” 38
A meaningful general deterrent effect from prosecuting illegal
entrants and re-entrants, however, was unlikely. Criminologists have
chronicled the struggle of criminal law to deter conduct. 39 Among the
many problems are the underlying assumptions behind obtaining a
meaningful deterrent effect—namely, that individuals contemplating
committing crimes are also rational actors who know, and take into
account, the potential criminal consequences of their actions. 40 Even
setting aside those hurdles, there are special reasons to doubt that
prosecuting illegal entrants and re-entrants would deter individuals from
coming to the United States.
First, the knowledge hurdle is particularly acute in the context of
prosecuting illegal entry and re-entry cases because the target audience
is comprised of non-U.S. residents, many of whom neither have any
familiarity with U.S. law nor speak English.
Second, the most important ingredient to an effective deterrent

35. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 30, at 21 (noting that the government had initiated
113 illegal re-entry prosecutions within the first two months of the law taking effect and that the
government initiated 1286 prosecutions for illegal entry within the first four months).
36. Id. The report documented that the average sentence length for an illegal re-entry
conviction was about six months and the average sentence length for an illegal entry conviction
was about two months. Id.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 91 tbl.33 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb
_2009.pdf.
38. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 30, at 21.
39. For an overview of the literature and a critique of the relationship between deterrence
theory and criminal law, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004). See also David E.
Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1427, 1431–35 (2011) (summarizing criticism of increased sentence severity as a criminal
deterrence tool).
40. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 39, at 175–81.
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scheme—far more important than the potential penalty meted out—is
the likelihood of prosecution. 41 The chance of prosecution for illegal
entry and re-entry, however, was miniscule. In 1930, although the
government prosecuted a large percentage of the deportable aliens it
apprehended, the government could not apprehend even a modest
percentage of illegal entrants and re-entrants because the borders were
still mostly unguarded; indeed, they remained that way until the
1990s. 42 This condition meant that the ultimate risk of prosecution was
trivial. 43
Third, individuals who illegally entered in the 1930s were (as they
are today) quite motivated to come to the United States because
typically they were looking for a better paying job and a better way of
life. 44 Indeed, this motivation explained why immigrants were willing
to move to a foreign country—and incur the collateral financial and
personal costs of moving—in the first place. If bearing both those costs
and the threat of deportation were not enough to dissuade someone from
entering the United States illegally, the (particularly weak) threat of
criminal prosecution was not likely to dissuade anyone either. 45
Thus, even in 1929, it was doubtful that prosecuting illegal entrants
and re-entrants had a meaningful impact on illegal immigration beyond
that provided by the threat of deportation. The result was that the
mismatch of using the criminal justice system to deter unlawful border
crossings was woven into the fabric of the crimes from the beginning.

41. Substantial research indicates that the certainty of apprehension, rather than the severity of
penalty, is by far the most relevant factor in the deterrence calculus. See THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF
PUNISHMENT (Nov. 2010) (providing an overview of the relevant literature); Michael Tonry,
Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 28 (2006) (“Current knowledge
concerning deterrence is little different than eighteenth-century theorists such as Beccaria . . .
supposed it to be: certainty and promptness of punishment are more powerful deterrents than
severity.”); Patton, supra note 39, at 1432–35 (discussing the importance of certainty and
swiftness of punishment in obtaining a deterrent effect and discussing research regarding the
same).
42. See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of the illegal entry and re-entry provisions
from the early 1990s to the early 2000s).
43. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 39, at 182 (noting that the perceived cost of actions
affects the deterrence calculus).
44. See NGAI, supra note 15, at 70 (noting that many Mexican immigrants in the 1930s
entered into the United States to work).
45. This was particularly so because defendants convicted of illegal entry or re-entry were not
likely to receive a severe sentence; the maximum sentence could be only one year for illegal entry
and two years for illegal re-entry. As a practical matter, most defendants received a sentence of a
few months. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 30, at 21 (documenting that the average
sentence length for an illegal re-entry conviction was about six months and the average sentence
length for an illegal entry conviction was about two months).
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In any event, in the 1930s, the tumultuous changes in immigration
law over the previous decades gave way to a period of legislative
stability. Congress, grappling with the Great Depression, passed almost
no immigration bills during the decade and, as one treatise explains,
became “disposed to consider the subject [of immigration] adequately
cared for.” 46 Moreover, as the promise of jobs evaporated, legal
immigration during the 1930s plummeted. 47 Approximately a halfmillion immigrants entered the United States during that decade, the
fewest number since the 1820s. 48
The lack of employment
opportunities also meant the United States no longer perceived that it
needed cheap, foreign labor. 49 As a result, immigration officials
removed a large number of Mexican nationals from the country—
according to one estimate, “[m]ore than [one] million people of
Mexican ancestry were forcibly removed from the United States during
the Depression years.” 50 A more limited number of individuals—
approximately 5000 a year—were prosecuted and convicted of illegal
entry or re-entry before being removed, 51 a number that still reflected a
low overall prosecution rate when compared to the large number of
individuals that likely entered the United States illegally.
Unlike the 1930s, the 1940s witnessed several important
developments in immigration law and policy. Congress both restricted
immigration by expanding the list of deportable offenses, 52 and
liberalized it by repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act, which had barred
Chinese laborers from entering the United States since 1882. 53

46. HUTCHINSON, supra note 15, at 249–50.
47. See NGAI, supra note 15, at 71 (noting that Mexican immigration declined in the 1930s
due to the government’s exclusionary policies as well as the Depression).
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 tbl.1 (2006).
49. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND
THE I.N.S. 7 (1992) (noting that Mexicans provided a “critical supply of cheap labor” to
American agriculture and industry, and that early twentieth century immigration restrictions
provided specific exceptions for Mexicans); NGAI, supra note 15, at 135 (noting that the flood of
cheap Mexican labor resulted in both depressed wages and market prices, and that many white
farmers felt they were hurt economically by Mexican immigrant labor).
50. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 215
(2007).
51. See NGAI, supra note 15, at 60 n.14 (“Between 1930 and 1936 the service brought over
40,000 criminal cases against unlawful entrants, winning convictions in some 36,000, or [ninety]
percent, of them.”).
52. See, e.g., Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670,
671 (making it a deportable offense when one, “within five years after entry . . . knowingly and
for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter
the United States in violation of law”).
53. Act of December 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-199, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.
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Congress also codified the practice of “voluntary departure,” whereby
immigration authorities allowed individuals with “good moral
character,” who would otherwise be deported, to leave the country
voluntarily. 54
Granting an alien voluntary departure saved the
government the time and expense of deportation proceedings, and aliens
could avoid having an order of deportation entered against them. 55 This
benefit was valuable to the alien, in part, because a defendant who
illegally returned to the United States after having been granted
voluntary departure could not be prosecuted for illegal re-entry—by
definition, committing illegal re-entry requires the defendant to have
previously been ordered deported. 56 Instead, this individual could be
prosecuted only for illegal entry—a crime that carried a lower statutorymaximum penalty. 57
The early 1940s also saw a phenomenon that had serious
reverberations throughout immigration policy: the country’s labor
shortage—particularly of agricultural workers—due to World War II. 58
This labor shortage led to an unprecedented influx of Mexican workers,
many of whom were welcomed back after their earlier removal during
the Great Depression. 59 Many laborers entered the United States legally
through a worker program called the Bracero program. 60 Through the
Bracero program, the United States actively encouraged Mexican
migration as “a cheap source of labor for southwest agribusiness

54. See Alien Registration Act (ARA) of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 671–73 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1940)).
55. See, e.g., Chelsea Walsh, Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2857, 2868 (2005) (“For the government, voluntary departure expedites
and reduces the cost of removal. In addition, the relief of voluntary departure is an important
benefit to a deportable alien because he avoids the stigma of deportation, is able to select his own
destination, and can leave the United States at his own expense without being subject to the
penalties and restrictions that deportation imposes.” (footnotes, quotations, and citation omitted)).
56. See Act of March 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 1, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 180(a)
(1929 sup. III)).
57. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 180a (1940) (one-year statutory-maximum penalty for illegal entry),
with id. § 180 (1940) (two-year statutory-maximum penalty for illegal re-entry).
58. See Ediberto Román, The Alien Invasion, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 878–79 (2008)
(discussing the creation of the Bracero program in response to labor shortages during the war);
Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and
Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 664 (1980) (“As the economy grew stronger with the approach of
World War II, most of the ‘Okies’ and ‘Arkies’ relocated to better paying industrial jobs. Their
exodus and the new agricultural expansion renewed the need for domestic labor.”); see also S.
REP. NO. 81-1515, at 574 (1950) (discussing the shortage of agricultural workers that followed
World War II).
59. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 584.
60. See Román, supra note 58, at 879; Lopez, supra note 58, at 664. For a discussion of the
Bracero program, see KANSTROOM, supra note 50, at 219–24.
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interests.” 61 “An immediate consequence of the Bracero program,”
however, “was that the promise of guaranteed employment
unintentionally encouraged illegal border crossings,” 62 meaning many
Mexican laborers entered the United States illegally, outside the
channels provided by the program. 63 In fact, government reports about
immigration during the late 1940s and early 1950s are replete with
references to illegal Mexican immigration. One report refers to the
“outstanding problem” of Mexican nationals “crossing the borders
illegally.” 64 Another report discusses the “problem” of “illegal entrants
from Mexico,” connecting this influx to the “shortage of agricultural
laborers during World War II.” 65 Indeed, apprehensions along the U.S.Mexico border in the 1940s increased by a factor of ten. 66
In response to the increasing number of Mexican migrants who came
to the United States to work, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which
had just taken over immigration from the Department of Labor, 67 began
prosecuting more immigration cases. These prosecutions, DOJ claimed,
acted as a “deterrent”—the prosecutions would dissuade at least some
individuals from entering the United States illegally and outside the
confines of the Bracero program. 68 By 1948 (the first year the annual
number of illegal entry and re-entry convictions became regularly
available), there were around 8000 combined convictions for illegal
entry and re-entry. 69 That number increased to 10,000 by 1949 70 and
grew to nearly 15,000 by 1951. 71 But nearly all individuals caught
illegally entering or re-entering were still strictly funneled through the
61. See ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 33.
62. Id.
63. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 489 (2009) (“In 1950, President Truman had established a Commission on Migratory
Labor, whose final report documented the high levels of illegal immigration that had
accompanied the Bracero Program . . . .”); ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 33–34.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 6 (1950).
65. Id. at 2. See ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 33–34 (discussing the relationship between the
Bracero program and illegal immigration).
66. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 584 (1950).
67. See Act of June 14, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-75, § 3, 54 Stat. 230, 231.
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 2–4, 9–11 (1951).
69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 81 tbl.49A (1957) (noting that there were nearly 3500 convictions for illegal entry and
over 4100 convictions for illegal re-entry).
70. See id. (documenting that there were 5108 illegal entry convictions and 4416 illegal reentry convictions in 1949).
71. See id. (documenting that there were nearly 13,000 illegal entry convictions and 2000
illegal re-entry convictions).
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civil enforcement system and granted voluntary departure. 72 Around
500,000 aliens were apprehended every year, most of whom could have
been prosecuted for illegal entry or re-entry. 73 DOJ, then, was
prosecuting an insignificant number of cases, compounding the earlier
problem that criminalizing illegal entry and re-entry were unlikely to
deter illegal immigration—there was still a small chance of being
apprehended and the benefits to illegal immigration were still large.
Thus, to the extent that individuals in Mexico considered the risk of
prosecution when deciding whether to come to the United States
illegally, it was implausible that individuals were dissuaded by this
risk. 74 Therefore, DOJ’s prosecution strategy made little sense.
While DOJ claimed it wanted to prosecute cases, a practical problem
held them back: insufficient resources. According to an immigration
official who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950,
“many flagrant violators of the immigration laws” were not prosecuted
because of the “crowded conditions prevalent in most prisons and
penitentiaries.” 75 At a budget hearing, a DOJ representative also
acknowledged the huge number of immigration violators along the
U.S.-Mexico border, most of whom were “Mexican laborers” that were
“seek[ing] employment,” but that the agency “couldn’t begin to
prosecute all of the people who [had] come in.” 76
But aside from DOJ’s rhetoric about deterrence and being stymied by
a lack of resources, nothing indicates that DOJ officials actually wanted
to discourage Mexican migrants from filling the employment needs of
the United States. Indeed, immigration officials were under tremendous
pressure from both business leaders and at least some politicians to not
stand in the way of this cheap source of labor. 77 Too much
enforcement, in fact, occasionally led members of Congress to threaten
to cut the budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

72. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 95 tbl.36.
73. See id. at 91 tbl.33.
74. Of course, if individuals in Mexico possessed no information about the threat of
prosecution, or if they did not take such information into account—both of which seem likely—
DOJ’s prosecution strategy would likely have no meaningful deterrent effect anyway. See
Robinson & Darley, supra note 39, at 175–79 (discussing the legal-knowledge hurdle that
prevents criminal law from deterring bad behavior, along with the fact that individuals often do
not make “rational choices” and so therefore do not take into account criminal law when making
decisions, even if they are aware of the relevant criminal law rules).
75. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 654 (1950).
76. Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 161 (1952)
(statement of J.M. McInerney).
77. See CALAVITA, supra note 49, at 34–35 (noting that farmers frequently criticized
immigration officials who zealously enforced immigration laws).
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(“INS”), the division of DOJ that dealt with civil immigration
enforcement. 78 The result was that immigration officials—far from
trying to discourage illegal immigration—facilitated it. While the law
required that Mexican laborers obtain permission from INS officials
before coming to the United States to work, most laborers would first
enter unlawfully and immigration officials would then “parole[]” the
individual directly to a U.S. employer. 79 As word spread that the way
to take part in the Bracero program was to enter unlawfully, most who
took part during the late 1940s and early 1950s entered the United
States in this manner. 80 Thus, INS’s administration of the Bracero
program actively encouraged illegal immigration, and “the preference
given to illegal aliens for bracero employment provided little incentive
for aspiring braceros to remain in Mexico until they were legally
contracted.” 81 Rather than prosecute individuals for illegally entering,
immigration officials rewarded the conduct in the form of a job.
Given DOJ’s complicity in fostering illegal immigration, it is perhaps
surprising that DOJ prosecuted anyone for illegal entry or re-entry at all.
If DOJ did not want to deter illegal immigration, why did it prosecute
anyone?
One possible answer is supplied by Peter Andreas, who has written
extensively about what he views as the strictly symbolic purpose of
border enforcement. Andreas has argued that border enforcement is not
really about deterring illegal immigration—rather, it is about
“projecting an image of progress toward that goal,” thereby allowing
politicians to affirm to the public the symbolic importance of the border
as a divide. 82
Thus, this “audience-directed nature of border
enforcement” requires border-enforcement efforts to be understood as a
message to the public, rather than as a message to individuals
considering coming to the United States illegally. 83 And while Andreas
has focused on civil enforcement, his argument resonates much more
strongly with the use of the criminal justice system. After all, “the
traditional view is that criminal law carries a unique stigma and moral
message not associated with other symbolic legal actions.” 84 By
78. See id. at 29, 35–37 (noting that Congressional representatives constantly reminded INS
that rigid enforcement of immigration law was undesirable if it resulted in “the reduction of the
farm labor supply”).
79. Id. at 28–29.
80. See id. (noting that, in 1950, “over 96,000 illegal aliens were paroled to local farmers”).
81. Id. at 32.
82. ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 9–11 (discussing the “audience-directed nature” of border
enforcement).
83. See id. at 10.
84. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for
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prosecuting more cases, the Executive Branch could send a particularly
loud message to the public affirming the importance of the border,
while at the same time not actually discouraging illegal immigration,
thereby allowing the United States to reap the benefits of the cheap
supply of labor.
B. The Development of the Modern Statutory Framework (1952–1986)
In 1952, Congress passed (over presidential veto) comprehensive
immigration reform. 85 The McCarran-Walter Act re-codified all of
immigration law, repealing large swaths of prior law and creating a
bevy of new provisions along the way. 86 The Act also included updated
illegal entry and re-entry provisions.
The illegal entry provision made it a crime for an “alien” (i.e., a noncitizen) to “(1) enter[] the United States at any time or place other than
as designated by immigration officers, or (2) elude[] examination or
inspection by immigration officers, or (3) obtain[] entry to the United
States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful
concealment of a material fact.” 87 Thus, consistent with prior law, the
Act did not criminalize mere presence in the United States without legal
permission; rather, it criminalized illegal entry. Individuals who legally
entered the United States (for example, with a valid visa) but who
thereafter lost legal permission to be in the country (for example, if their
visas expired) would not have committed a crime. 88 Under the Act, a
first illegal entry offense was a misdemeanor, punishable by up to six
months in prison; a second illegal entry conviction was a felony,
punishable by up to two years in prison. 89 Of particular significance is
that Congress decreased the penalty for a first illegal entry offense to six
months—it had been one year under the 1929 law90—which meant that
the first illegal entry offense became a “petty offense.” 91 This change
Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1266 (2000).
85. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 15, at 303–07.
86. See generally Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 275, 66 Stat. 163. See
also H.R. REP. 82-1365, at 27 (1951) (“[This bill] represents the first attempt to bring within one
cohesive and comprehensive statute the various laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and
nationality.”); Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 314–16 (1956) (discussing the Act’s various provisions).
87. 66 Stat. 163 at 229.
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (providing that a nonimmigrant visa holder who violates
the terms of the visa is subject to deportation); Matter of Santos, 19 I. & N. Dec. 105, 109 n.2
(1984) (“No crime is implicated when an alien overstays his allotted time [in his visa].”).
89. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 275, 66 Stat. 163, 229. The illegal
entry provision was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325, where it remains.
90. Act of March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551.
91. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996) (stating that offenses for which the
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was perhaps enacted in response to a concern of Texas immigration
officials that jurors might be hostile to criminal enforcement of
immigration laws against Mexican economic migrants. 92 Defendants
charged with petty offenses do not have a constitutional right to a jury
trial. 93 The legislative history, however, does not reveal a reason for the
penalty decrease. 94 Nevertheless, the decision to reduce the maximum
penalty for illegal entry to six months had important reverberations
down the road, which this Article will explore later. 95
In addition to the illegal entry provision, the Act also took the three
scattered criminal illegal re-entry provisions (i.e., the anarchism,
prostitution, and general illegal re-entry statutes) and mashed them into
one general illegal re-entry provision, thereby eliminating any
distinction between illegal re-entrants:
(a) . . . [A]ny alien who—
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States, unless [the alien establishes he received permission from
the Attorney General to return or the alien can demonstrate he did
not need such permission] shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than
two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 96

In essence, Congress had replicated the former general illegal reentry provision, with one primary exception: Congress included, for the
first time, a “found in” provision, which meant that the act of being in
the country illegally was itself a crime if the defendant was “found in”
the United States after having been deported. 97 Thus, mere presence in
statutory-maximum penalty was six months or less were presumptively “petty offenses” for
which the constitutional right of a jury trial did not attach).
92. See Immigration and Naturalization: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 30 (1948) (noting the local hostility to enforcing
immigration law, particularly against farmers and employees of farmers).
93. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 325.
94. A 1950 Senate report does note that the committee rejected a suggestion made “for a more
severe penalty for illegal entry and smuggling” to resolve the problem of individuals returning to
the United States illegally right after they had been deported; the committee noted that the
problem was with the “administration of present statutes,” rather than a problem with the statutes
themselves. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 654–55 (1950). A harsher penalty scheme, the Committee
noted, would therefore “not solve the problem.” Id.
95. The lower statutory-maximum penalty meant a first-time illegal entry offense could be
deemed a “petty offense,” which meant the defendant would not have the right to a jury trial and
the cases could be prosecuted by magistrate judges. See infra Part III.
96. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229. The
provision was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326, where it remains.
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (stating that any alien who is found in the United States
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the country without legal permission could be a crime, but only if the
defendant had previously been deported and had not obtained the
Attorney General’s permission to return. 98 The only legislative history
that discusses either the illegal entry or re-entry provision indicates that
adding the “found in” provision to the illegal re-entry statute was
intended to fix a flaw in prior law. 99 Without the “found in” provision,
immigration officials had experienced difficulties in “establish[ing] the
place of re-entry, and hence the prior venue,” for prosecuting illegal reentry cases, 100 given that the Sixth Amendment requires defendants to
be tried in the district in which the “crime shall have been
committed.” 101 With the “found in” provision, venue would be proper
in any district in which the defendant was found, instead of just the
district in which the defendant illegally re-entered.
As the Act took effect, “attention shifted to the increasingly vexing
problem of illegal immigration.” 102 A presidential commission on
immigration, for example, likened the situation along the U.S.-Mexico
border to an “invasion.” 103 The Attorney General himself toured the
U.S.-Mexico border, calling the scale of illegal immigration “shocking”
and declaring that it “constituted one of the nation’s gravest lawenforcement problems.” 104 Despite these concerns—and reflective of
the contradictory attitudes toward illegal immigration—the Attorney
General recommended a decrease in the United States Border Patrol
(“Border Patrol”) budget. 105
In 1954, General Joseph Swing was put in charge of INS and tasked
with resolving this contradiction. Swing pledged to “stop this horde of
invaders.” 106 At the same time, however, he recognized the urgent need

following a lawful deportation shall be fined or imprisoned). Congress also eliminated the
requirement that the deportation be “in pursuance of law.” See 8 U.S.C. § 180(a) (1929 sup. IV)
(noting that any alien who attempts to re-enter the United States following a lawful deportation
shall be subject to a fine of imprisonment).
98. United States v. Garcia, No. 6:08-cr-81-Orl-19GJK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63478, at *54
n.26 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2008), aff’d, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010).
99. The only other piece of legislative history concerning the two provisions merely
documents their existence. See United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 557 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir.
1977) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and citing 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1724).
100. Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws; J. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong. 716
(1951) (discussing section 276 of the law, which became 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in the final legislation).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102. CALAVITA, supra note 49, at 46.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id. at 51.
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for Mexican labor. He thus reached something of a compromise. On
the one hand, he made it clear to employers that if they needed cheap
Mexican labor, they could obtain it through the legal channels of the
Bracero program. 107 And on this promise, Swing came through: by the
mid-1950s, the Bracero program doubled in size as over 400,000
Mexican laborers a year were given permission to work in the United
States. 108 On the other hand, Swing launched a nationwide roundup of
Mexican migrants and returned them to Mexico—an effort plagued by
widespread claims of abuse, including that the United States removed
many individuals with legal permission to live in the country. 109 The
roundup, dubbed “Operation Wetback,” resulted in the removal of
hundreds of thousands of individuals. 110 Many migrants also left
voluntarily, “as Swing capitalized on the sensationalism of the media
coverage and a few well-placed and highly visible displays of force to
create the illusion of a far greater presence than the Border Patrol could
actually muster.” 111 Along with Operation Wetback, and the rising
concern over illegal immigration, DOJ also ramped up its prosecution
effort. In 1954, there were nearly 14,000 convictions, double the annual
convictions just a decade before, 112 but still less than the 2% of
deportable aliens who were apprehended for that year. 113
After Operation Wetback ended, Swing essentially declared victory
over illegal immigration. In a 1955 report, he wrote that “[f]or the first
time in more than ten years, illegal crossing over the Mexican border
was brought under control.” 114 A year later, he wrote that illegal entries
from Mexico had “stopped,” crediting Operation Wetback and the large
expansion of the Bracero program. 115 He also pointed out that the sharp
decrease in immigration prosecutions—illegal entry and re-entry
prosecutions had dropped below 3000 by 1956 116—was “directly
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
NGAI, supra note 15, at 155–56.
See CALAVITA, supra note 49, at 54.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 90 tbl.49A (1958) [hereinafter 1958 INS ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that there were
around 11,000 illegal entry convictions in 1954); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 99 tbl.54 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 INS
ANNUAL REPORT] (documenting the illegal re-entry convictions from 1952 to 1961).
113. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 91 tbl.33.
114. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 399 (1955).
115. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 408–10, 414 (1956).
116. See 1958 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 90 tbl.49A (noting that there were
around 11,000 illegal entry convictions in 1954); 1961 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at
99 tbl.54 (documenting the illegal re-entry convictions from 1952 to 1961).
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attributable to the successful control maintained on the Mexican
Border.” 117 Swing had a similarly triumphant message a year later,
when he wrote that “[t]he arrest of a greater proportion of aliens while
in the act of entering, together with the prosecution of the most flagrant
violators, with accompanying publicity, was the principal factor which
brought about a continued reduction in apprehensions along the
Mexican border.” 118 Prosecutions for illegal entry and re-entry
continued to drop, totaling less than 2000 combined convictions in
1957, one-seventh the average number of annual prosecutions around
the time of Operation Wetback. 119 Indeed, throughout the next ten
years, the government continued to show little interest in using the
criminal justice system to regulate immigration. 120 But the belief that
immigration officials had successfully deterred individuals from
entering the United States illegally would not persist.
Figures 1 and 2, below, compare the combined illegal entry and reentry convictions and deportable aliens apprehended between 1948 and
1986, respectively.
FIGURE 1

Combined Illegal Entry and Re-entry Convictions
(1948–1986)
15,000
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117.
118.
119.
120.

1956 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 431.
1957 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 439.
1958 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 90 tbl.49A.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE tbl.54 (1969) (documenting convictions from 1960 until 1969); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE tbl.
53 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 INS ANNUAL REPORT] (documenting convictions from 1969 to
1978); see also 1958 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 395 (observing that the decrease in illegal entry
convictions “follows the trend of fewer illegal entries and is attributable to the successful control
of the Mexican border”).
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FIGURE 2

Deportable Aliens Apprehended
(1948–1986)
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By the early 1960s, as the Bracero program became more politically
controversial, the government allowed fewer and fewer Bracero laborers
to enter into the United States. Illegal immigration started to once again
proliferate, 121 indicating that Swing’s confidence had been misplaced.
Shortly thereafter, two events occurred that dramatically accelerated the
number of illegal entrants from Mexico, resulting in aftershocks felt in
illegal entry and re-entry policy to this day. First, in 1964, the Bracero
program became controversial enough that it ended. 122 The demand of
U.S. business for cheap Mexican labor, however, did not. The
predictable consequence was that while Mexican laborers continued to
remain a prime source of cheap labor, they would no longer have legal
status to work in the United States. 123 Thus, Mexican laborers were
transformed overnight from legal workers to “illegal aliens.” Second,
Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1965, ending the national-

121. See CALAVITA, supra note 49, at 142–51; 1964 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 420 (“Principal
contributing factors to the 13 percent increase in the number of Mexican nationals found to be
here unlawfully were the expected termination of the ‘Bracero’ program . . . and the far reaching
effects of a continued severe drought in Mexico, accompanied by a marked deterioration of the
ranch economy there. These factors probably will result in continued efforts to cross the border
surreptitiously.”).
122. NGAI, supra note 15, at 158.
123. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1401, 1429 (2007); see also David A. Martin, Eight Myths about Immigration Enforcement, 10
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 534–35 (2007) (“In the absence of effective [immigration]
enforcement [after the Bracero program ended], employers were glad to continue using workers
who by then were well-trained and familiar with the farm or business. Workers likewise found it
convenient to continue the cycle by sneaking across the border. Moreover, they often brought
friends or family members along to replenish the worker pool.”).
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origin-based quota system that had been in place since the 1920s. 124 In
its place, Congress erected a system that placed country quotas on
immigration, including a 20,000 annual quota on Mexican immigrants,
a mere fraction of what the quota had been under the Bracero
program. 125
With the sharp reduction of legal immigration from Mexico,
individuals from Mexico continued to enter the United States illegally
in numbers large enough to meet the United States’ demand for cheap
labor. Nevertheless, DOJ kept illegal entry and re-entry convictions at
historically low levels. These convictions consistently numbered less
than 2000 a year through the 1960s, a fraction of what they had been a
decade before. 126 The pointlessness of arbitrarily prosecuting a few
individuals in the name of promoting deterrence was not lost on
everyone. For example, a district court judge along the border testified
before Congress in 1969 that the “token prosecution of aliens [along the
U.S.-Mexico border] is not a way to achieve effective observance of the
law or respect for the law.” 127 He further lamented the fact that neither
DOJ nor INS “seem to have any policy as to when a repeated offender
is to be prosecuted, nor do they have any means of prompt identification
of the individual through the FBI to determine his prior record, federal
or state.” 128 But given that immigration officials were apprehending
hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens a year, 129 a coherent
prosecution policy was perhaps impossible—at least if the purpose of
the policy was deterrence.
In the midst of these depressed criminal enforcement efforts,
Congress contemplated creating the position of “magistrate judge,” who
would be empowered to (among other things) deal with petty offenses
such as illegal entry cases. In fact, immigration officials lobbied
Congress to create the new position so that illegal entry cases could
avoid congested district court dockets, thereby allowing both
immigration and non-immigration cases to be dealt with more

124. Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 18, 79 Stat. 911.
125. See CALAVITA, supra note 49, at 218 (providing statistics about the Bracero program).
126. See 1978 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 103 tbl.53 (documenting the illegal
convictions from 1969 to 1978); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, 1985 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 213 (1985) (documenting the
convictions from 1978 to 1985).
127. Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness, Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on
Migratory Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong. 2800 (1969) (statement
of Hon. Edward M. Kennedy).
128. Id. at 2801.
129. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 91 tbl.33 (listing
the number of deportable aliens apprehended per year).
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swiftly. 130 Immigration officials had the support of district court judges
along the border, who thought magistrates could help to partially
alleviate their crowded dockets, where immigration prosecutions still
dominated. 131 Eventually, in 1968, Congress relented and passed the
Federal Magistrates Act. 132
During the early 1970s, as magistrates were being staffed along the
border, 133 DOJ once again started to increase the number of illegal entry
and re-entry prosecutions. By 1973, there were once again nearly
14,000 combined prosecutions. 134 Unlike earlier years, however, nearly
all of the convictions were for illegal entry, which could be quickly
processed with the help of magistrates (since, unlike illegal re-entry
charges, illegal entry charges could be deemed a petty offense). 135 The
total number of prosecutions still represented a tiny percentage of the
nearly 600,000 deportable aliens who were apprehended in 1973. 136
This surge in prosecutions once again put tremendous pressure on
border districts. Illegal entry cases were overrunning the dockets of
judges in Southern California, and civil cases could not go to trial
because the judges lacked necessary courtroom time. 137 To help
alleviate this pressure—and foreshadowing DOJ’s present-day
strategy—prosecutors in the district developed a way to process illegal
entry cases more quickly, labeling it the “flip flop.” Apprehended
individuals who had been previously deported would be charged with a
two-count complaint—one count of misdemeanor illegal entry (with its

130. See Eagly, supra note 2, at 1326 (citing Hearing on H.R. 9970 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 102 (1968) (statement of Glenn L. Weatherman, INS,
Del Rio, Texas)) (stating that the immigration agency asked Congress to establish a
“misdemeanor court” that would allow for more effecting and less expensive criminal
investigation enforcement).
131. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 603–05 (1967); Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness:
Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 91st Cong. 2802–03 (1969).
132. Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–39 (2006)); see Eagly, supra note 2, at 1325–26 (discussing the creation of
the position of magistrate).
133. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 747 (1973) [hereinafter Hearing, 93d Cong.] (written statement of Hon.
Edward J. Schwartz, C.J. of the S.D. of Cal.).
134. See 1978 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 103 tbl.53 (documenting the illegal
convictions from 1969 until 1978).
135. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
136. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 91 tbl.33 (noting
that more than 655,000 deportable aliens were located in 1973).
137. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 751 (1973).
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six-month statutory-maximum penalty) and one count for felony illegal
re-entry (with its two-year statutory-maximum penalty). 138 If the
defendant quickly agreed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor count of
illegal entry, the prosecutor dropped the felony illegal re-entry count.139
The “flip flop” benefitted both parties—the defendant avoided a felony
conviction and received a lower statutory-maximum penalty, while the
government could more efficiently process the case by avoiding the
crowded district court docket and avoiding having to obtain a grand jury
indictment. 140 Thus, to grow the number of prosecutions by a small
fraction of a percent, DOJ was content to both reduce the process
afforded defendants and put a strain on border districts.
This tradeoff was not without its detractors, especially since DOJ had
not given a rationale for determining which persons, among the
hundreds of thousands of people it apprehended, should be prosecuted
and then deported, and those who should just be deported. As the head
federal public defender in San Diego explained in 1973:
It is obvious that there is broad discretion in the handling of [illegal
entry and re-entry cases], and in our experience cases are seldom
prosecuted for first offenders. Often the initiation of the charges
depends upon the whim of the Border Patrol officer (in forwarding the
case to the United States Attorney’s Office) and the policy discretion
of the United States Attorney. 141

Thus, he recommended to a congressional committee charged with
reforming the federal criminal code that the offense of illegal entry be
abolished, reasoning that “the greatest deterrent to illegal aliens is the
expectation of apprehension and return to Mexico. The criminal penalty
over the years has not proved effective in deterring illegal entry.” 142
Judges were likewise concerned. For example, Judge Schwartz, from
the Southern District of California, testified before Congress in 1973
that he “hope[d] that in improving the judicial machinery we don’t
reach the point where we are making an assembly line out of our
judicial process. Because then, unlike Detroit, we can’t recall a few
thousand of our mistakes to straighten them out again.” 143

138. Id. at 748.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong. 298 (1979) (written statement of John J. Clearly).
142. Id. at 298–99.
143. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 751 (1973).

ARTICLE_2_KELLER.DOCX

92

11/6/2012 11:19 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

Judge Schwartz’s worries were prophetic, as DOJ would eventually
funnel tens of thousands of illegal entrants and re-entrants quickly
through the criminal justice system like cars on a conveyor belt. But in
the beginning, his worries about “assembly line” justice were not
realized, as illegal entry and re-entry convictions, after a brief increase
to 17,000 combined convictions in 1976, steadily declined over the next
two decades, consistently numbering less than 10,000 a year. 144 Thus,
even as the number of deportable aliens who were apprehended
soared, 145 DOJ became less inclined to prosecute immigration
offenders. DOJ had perhaps recognized the futility of prosecuting a tiny
fraction of illegal entrants and re-entrants as a means to deter illegal
immigration, and the department backed off its escalating prosecution
policy. It was about time to devise a new prosecution strategy.
II. A SHIFT IN STRATEGY: TARGETING “DANGEROUS” ALIENS, INCLUDING
PERJURERS, SHOPLIFTERS, AND BAD-CHECK WRITERS (1987–2004)
Starting in 1987, the United States charted a radically different course
regarding the way with which illegal entrants and re-entrants were dealt.
The crimes of illegal entry and re-entry saw a shift at the conceptual
level, as the crimes were reconceived as a way to target individuals
likely to commit crimes while in the United States illegally—to
specifically deter and incapacitate these individuals—rather than as
tools to discourage illegal immigration generally. This new strategy led
144. In 1986, Congress passed legislation that required employers to attest to their employee’s
immigration status, made it illegal to knowingly hire an individual without legal status to work,
and provided a path toward legalization for some individuals who had been living in the country
without permission. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See Maria Isabel Medina, The
Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 669, 688–95 (1997) (discussing the ineffectiveness of the Act in deterring attempts at
unauthorized entry into the U.S.); Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 357–69 (1994)
(same). The employer penalty was the first real attempt to regulate the demand side of illegal
immigration. By disincentivizing employers to hire individuals without legal status, it was
intended that economic migrants from Mexico would no longer be able to find work in United
States, drying up their primary justification for coming to the United States. Stephen Lee, Private
Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (2009); Phi Mai
Nguyen, Comment, Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration: Over Two Decades of
Ineffective Provisions while Solutions Are Just a Few Words Away, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 615, 615–
16, 624–27 (2010). The system, however, has never been meaningfully enforced, and most
scholars believe it has been irrelevant in curbing illegal immigration. See, e.g., ANDREAS, supra
note 15, at 38–39, 86–87; Nguyen, supra, at 632–44.
145. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 95 tbl.36
(documenting the increasing number of civil enforcement actions taken during the late 1970s and
early 1980s); id. at 91 tbl.33 (documenting the increasing number of deportable aliens
apprehended during the late 1970s and early 1980s).
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to a record increase in the number of prosecutions. Unfortunately, the
proxy used to determine if an apprehended alien would likely commit a
crime was dreadfully designed. The consequence was that truly
dangerous individuals were not in the vast majority of those targeted.
Moreover, and perhaps even more troubling, defendants received
increasingly harsh and arbitrary sentences. In short, DOJ went from
employing a failed deterrence strategy to using an ineffective and
poorly conceived general crime-control strategy.
A. Congress and the Sentencing Commission Plant the Seeds for a New
Criminal Enforcement Strategy (1987–1992)
Between 1987 and 1992, not much changed with respect to enforcing
the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry, as DOJ prosecuted between
3500 and 6500 such cases a year. 146 In addition, the U.S.-Mexico
border remained mostly unpatrolled. 147 Moreover, around a million
deportable aliens a year were apprehended, and nearly all of those who
were sent back to their country of origin were granted voluntary
departure. 148
But even though enforcement did not change
considerably, Congress planted the seeds for a new prosecution strategy
by creating a penalty scheme in illegal re-entry cases that would provide
for an increased sentence for the supposedly “dangerous” aliens who
tried to enter the United States illegally.
Before 1987, the process of federal sentencing could mostly be
summed up in three words: district court discretion. That is to say, the
federal sentencing process merely involved the district court judge
selecting a sentence from probation to the relevant statutory-maximum
penalty. 149 In illegal re-entry cases, for example, district court judges
could sentence defendants to penalties ranging from probation to the

146. Lead Charges for Criminal Prosecutions, FY 1986–FY 2011, TRAC, http://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/include/imm_charges.html (last visited June 29, 2011)
[hereinafter TRAC Immigration]. For prior Parts, this Article relied on government reports that
documented the number of illegal entry and re-entry convictions DOJ had secured. See, e.g.,
1978 INS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 103 tbl.53 (documenting the illegal convictions
from 1969 until 1978). Starting with this Part, this Article relies on the number of prosecutions
for illegal entry and re-entry cases as gathered by the Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), which compiles prosecution numbers through Freedom of Information Act requests.
See About Us, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html (last visited July 5, 2011). This
appears to be the best way to track the number of misdemeanor illegal entry cases.
147. ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 89–90 (noting the still relatively small size of the Border
Patrol in 1993).
148. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 91 tbl.33.
149. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1993).
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two-year statutory-maximum penalty. 150 This discretion, however, led
to complaints about unwarranted sentencing disparity since two
defendants who committed identical acts could receive radically
different sentences. 151
These concerns (among others) prompted Congress, in the mid
1980s, to create an expert sentencing commission and task it with
developing a mandatory guideline regime to reign in district court
discretion. 152
In creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(“Commission”), Congress made it an “independent” agency within the
judicial branch. 153
The Commission, in developing this new regime, attempted to
ground the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in pre-Guideline
practice, such that average sentence lengths would remain largely
unchanged. 154 Based on its past-practice study, the Commission
assigned nearly every federal crime a base offense level. Within any
particular case, this number could change, based on “specific offense
characteristics” relevant to the way the defendant committed the
offense—the offense level could increase based on aggravating
circumstances or decrease based on mitigating circumstances relevant to
the offense. 155 The Commission also developed a criminal history
score—a number that mostly hinged on the defendant’s recent criminal
convictions. 156 The criminal history score was calibrated to correspond
to a defendant’s likelihood of committing future crimes. 157 The
Commission’s final product, completed in 1987, is a regime that
revolves around a sentencing chart. The vertical axis of the chart is the
defendant’s adjusted offense level; 158 the horizontal axis is the
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (listing the criminal penalties for re-entry of removed aliens).
151. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
Troubling Silence about the Purpose of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1049–56
(2003); Stith & Koh, supra note 149, at 231; Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).
152. See Breyer, supra note 151, at 5–6 (describing the creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006) (establishing the Commission “as an independent commission
in the judicial branch of the United States”).
154. Id.
155. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL chs. 2–3
(1988) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (listing offense conduct and adjustments to sentencing).
156. See U.S.S.G. ch. 4 (1988) (delineating the calculation methods and results of criminal
history scores).
157. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 13 (2004) (relating sentencing types
to recidivism rates).
158. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (1988) (establishing appropriate sentencing
based on the offender’s offense level and criminal history category).
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defendant’s criminal history score. 159 At the intersection of a
defendant’s adjusted offense level and criminal history score is a
Guideline range, expressed in months. 160 The district court judge
would have to sentence the defendant within that range unless the
specific case involved an extraordinary circumstance that the Guidelines
failed to take into account. 161 In such a case, the judge could give a
“departure” from the otherwise mandatory Guideline range. 162 The
Guidelines, then, would constrain sentencing discretion. Defendants
who had similar criminal histories and who committed similar criminal
acts would receive similar sentences.
Section 2L1.2 of the Guidelines covered illegal entry and re-entry.
When the Guidelines went into effect, the Commission assigned both
crimes a base offense level of six. 163 The Commission also added a
two-level enhancement for defendants who had previously unlawfully
entered or unlawfully remained in the United States. 164 Thus, as a
practical matter, defendants convicted of illegal re-entry started with an
offense level of eight. A year later, in 1988, the Commission eliminated
the two-level enhancement and re-assigned illegal re-entry a base
offense level of eight, an offense level that remains to this day. 165
Furthermore, the Commission dropped illegal entry from the Guidelines
altogether. 166 Plugging an offense level of eight into the Commission’s
chart meant that, in 1988, defendants convicted of illegal re-entry had a
Guideline range anywhere from zero to six months (if they had no
criminal history) to eighteen to twenty-four months (if they were in the

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence [according to
this statute] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . .
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission . . . .”).
162. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94–96 (1996) (discussing when a district court
could use a departure); id. at 96 (noting that the Commission expected departures to be “highly
infrequent” (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, p. 6)).
163. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) (1987).
164. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1) (“If the defendant previously has unlawfully entered or
remained in the United States, increase by 2 levels.”).
165. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 23 (1988).
166. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (1988) (establishing a single base offense level in subsection (a)
after the deletion of subsection (b)). Nevertheless, defendants convicted of felony illegal entry
who could have been convicted of illegal re-entry still had to be sentenced under the illegal reentry Guideline provision; for other illegal entry defendants, sentencing judges essentially had the
same unbridled discretion they had pre-Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 (“If the offense is a
felony for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, apply the most analogous offense
guideline. If there is not a sufficiently analogous guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553
shall control . . . .”).
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highest criminal history category). 167 According to the Commission,
punishments generated under this scheme reflected the sentences given
pre-Guidelines. 168 Those ranges also fit neatly with the overarching
penalty scheme Congress had created, since the statutory-maximum
penalty for illegal re-entry was two years. 169
In 1988, however, Congress dramatically ratcheted up the potential
sentence a defendant could receive for illegal re-entry. Congress
increased the statutory-maximum penalty to five years for illegal reentry defendants who had previously been convicted of a “felony” 170—
any felony, no matter how minor 171—and to fifteen years for defendants
who had previously been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” 172 which
encompassed prior convictions for murder, drug trafficking, or weapons
trafficking. 173 (The term “aggravated felony” did not apply to illegal
167. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (1988) (establishing appropriate sentencing
based on the offender’s offense level and criminal history category).
168. According to the Commission, before the Guideline-era, those convicted of illegal reentry served the equivalent months of an offense level seven (zero to twenty-one months
imposed). See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 34 tbl.1(a) (1987) (establishing estimated
time served for baseline offenses by first-time offenders).
169. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (providing for “imprisonment of not more than two years”
for deported aliens who re-entered the U.S.).
170. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (1988)) (providing that an illegal re-entry defendant “whose
deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of a felony (other than an aggravated
felony) . . . shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both”). In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b),
the provision that contained the statutory-maximum penalty increases, did not set out a separate
crime, but rather a sentencing factor, and the government could therefore establish at an illegal reentry defendant’s sentencing that he or she had previously been convicted of a prior offense that
triggered the increased maximum penalty. 523 U.S. 224, 228–47 (1998).
171. While, historically, there was a meaningful distinction between the seriousness of
felonies and non-felonies, that is no longer the case. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14
(1985) (observing that, while “the gulf between the felonies and the minor offences was broad
and deep, today the distinction is minor and often arbitrary” (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
172. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7345(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 4471 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) (1988)) (providing that an illegal re-entry defendant “whose deportation was
subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony . . . shall be fined under [title
18, United States Code], imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both”).
173. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469–70 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) (1988)) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means murder, any drug trafficking crime
as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, or any illicit trafficking in any
firearms or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title, or any attempt or
conspiracy to commit any such act, committed within the United States.”). To determine whether
a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a generic offense like “murder” or as a “drug
trafficking” offense, courts must use the categorical approach, where they compare the elements
of the offense for which the defendant was convicted with the generic definition of the federal
crime at issue. See generally Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (laying out the
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re-entry sentencing only; a conviction for such a crime had, and to this
day has, a slew of collateral consequences for non-U.S. citizens. 174)
Legislative history from the 1988 Act provides some insight into why
Congress increased the statutory-maximum penalty for illegal re-entry
cases. In introducing the legislation, Senator Lawton Chiles stated that
the penalty increase would allow law enforcement officials to use the
crime of illegal re-entry as a way to target “alien drug traffickers who
are considering illegal entry into the United States.” 175 In particular, he
cited—as the type of defendant for which he thought the heightened
potential penalty was needed—the example of a drug kingpin, wanted
for around fifty murders, who had illegally returned to the United
States. 176 Senator Chiles also believed the government could use the
crime of illegal re-entry just as it had used the tax code to go after the
mob. 177
Senator Chiles’s comments reflected a new rationale for prosecuting
illegal re-entry cases. Rather than just focusing on deterring illegal
immigration—the long-held view of the purpose of illegal entry and reentry prosecutions—Senator Chiles thought that the enhancementpenalty scheme could target illegal re-entrants who came to the United
States to commit crimes. In this way, the penalty scheme sought to
protect the public from dangerous individuals, rather than to deter

categorical approach). In other words, courts must determine whether a particular crime, as a
categorical matter, is a qualifying offense. Courts are not to look at the actual facts, however, that
led to the conviction to begin with. I have previously argued that use of the categorical approach
is superior, as a policy matter, to a fact-based approach and worth its costs. See Doug Keller,
Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Applying ‘Legal Imagination’ to DuenasAlvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 658–67 (2011). See also Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole
Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration
Consequences of a Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (defending the categorical
approach as superior to a fact-driven approach in the immigration context).
174. For example, non-citizens, including legal permanent residents, who are convicted of an
aggravated felony are subject to mandatory detention during their removal proceedings and lose
the ability to apply for various forms of discretionary relief from removal. See Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 483–84 (2007) (discussing the immigration consequences
for a non-citizen if he or she is convicted of an aggravated felony).
175. See 133 CONG. REC. S4992-01 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Chiles); see
also 133 CONG. REC. H8961-01 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Rep. Smith) (introducing
the legislation in the House of Representatives and also connecting the legislation with the
problem of “illegal aliens” who commit series crimes).
176. See 133 CONG. REC. S4992-01 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
177. Id. (stating that the higher penalty provision would “give law enforcement authorities a
broader arena for prosecuting the drug offender as current tax fraud and mail fraud violations
provide”). Senator Chiles also initially suggested that illegal re-entry defendants who had been
convicted of an aggravated felony should receive a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence,
id., but that provision did not make it into the final legislation.
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illegal immigration per se, and the types of prior convictions that
triggered the enhanced penalty would act as a proxy for dangerousness.
Despite its announced rationale, however, the structure of Congress’s
penalty scheme guaranteed that it would struggle to target individuals
who were likely to commit crimes while in the United States. Even the
most sophisticated proxies for predicting future criminal conduct that
rely solely on an individual’s criminal history are, at best, “rough
approximations of actual dangerousness,” and using criminal history
alone to predict future dangerousness “guarantees errors of both
inclusion and exclusion.” 178
But Congress did not rely on a
sophisticated dangerousness proxy. Instead, it created a system
whereby a single prior conviction could trigger the statutory-maximum
penalty increase. No research suggests, however, that using a single
prior conviction is even a vaguely sound way to determine whether
someone is likely to commit a future crime. 179 Congress compounded
the problem by not including a “freshness” requirement on the prior
conviction, meaning that a single, dated conviction could trigger the
statutory-maximum increase, even though it would be dubious to infer
that the defendant had returned to the United States to commit crimes
because of conduct that occurred years or even decades before. In fact,
the Commission recognized that convictions which occurred over
fifteen years before the defendant’s present offense did not correlate to
future criminality, which is why it excluded such convictions from its
criminal history score. 180
Nevertheless, a sentencing scheme designed to prevent individuals
from committing crimes by locking them up for longer periods is bound
to be successful in the limited sense in which all incapacitation schemes
are successful. As noted criminologist David Patton explained,
“Inmates cannot commit crimes outside of prison while inside
prison.” 181 The more difficult policy question, however, is whether the
“financial, social, and moral” costs of a particular incapacitation scheme
outweigh the benefits 182—including whether the incapacitation scheme
178. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1450 (2001) (describing the problems with
preventative detention).
179. For a discussion of factors that do indicate if a defendant is likely to commit future
crimes, see generally MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 157.
180. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 n.1 (2011) (“A sentence imposed more than fifteen years prior to
the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense is not counted [in criminal history point
calculation] . . . .”).
181. See Patton, supra note 39, at 1435–36 (describing the sentencing theory of
incapacitation).
182. Id. at 1436.

ARTICLE_2_KELLER.DOCX

2012]

11/6/2012 11:19 AM

Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry

99

results in resources being allocated away from more effective crimeprevention strategies. When viewed through a cost-benefit lens, most
incapacitation schemes quickly lose their appeal.
For crimes of any significant seriousness, we are not very good at
predicting which offenders will commit them in the future. For every
“true positive” who will, three or four others predicted to do so will
not. From a cost-benefit perspective, locking up all those people is
not an obviously good investment of public resources. From a moral
perspective, many people are troubled by the thought of lengthy
confinement of individuals not because of their current crime but
because they might commit another, especially when we know most
will not. 183

Thus, while the congressional scheme was bound to snag at least some
truly dangerous aliens (like the ones Senator Chiles had identified), the
question Congress should have been struggling with was whether the
costs associated with longer sentences were worth the benefits to public
safety. By creating such a terrible proxy for dangerousness, Congress
guaranteed a large number of false positives, thereby ensuring its
incapacitation scheme would flunk any cost-benefit analysis.
Not only was Congress’s scheme over-inclusive, it was bizarrely
under-inclusive with respect to the goal of targeting dangerous
individuals in two ways. First, in the case of a defendant who illegally
returned to the United States and was convicted of another crime, the
defendant’s latest conviction would not trigger the enhanced penalty if
he were prosecuted for illegal re-entry. Only convictions that occurred
before the deportation could trigger the increase. 184 Thus, the one set of
defendants for which a proxy was unnecessary to determine whether
they were a threat to commit a crime after they illegally returned—
individuals who had illegally returned and actually committed a
crime—would not have their statutory-maximum penalty changed.
Second, Congress’s penalty scheme did not apply to dangerous aliens
convicted of illegal entry, as the statutory-maximum penalty for illegal
entry remained at six months for the first conviction and two years for
the second. 185 For example, the mass murderer in Senator Chiles’s

183. See Tonry, supra note 41, at 32 (describing this issue as the “false-positive problem”);
see also Patton, supra note 39, at 1435–38 (discussing the costs of incapacitation schemes).
184. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4181,
4471 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (1988)) (providing an increased statutory-maximum
penalty for an illegal re-entry defendant “whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction” for a
felony or an aggravated felony) (emphasis added).
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988) (“[Illegal entry by an alien is a misdemeanor on the first
offense, punishable by] imprisonment for not more than six months [and a felony on subsequent
offenses, punishable by] imprisonment for not more than two years.”).
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example could not receive a sentence greater than six months if, when
he illegally entered, he had not been previously deported. Thus,
Congress ensured that some truly dangerous aliens would not qualify
for the statutory-maximum increase.
A year after Congress created its new penalty scheme, the
Commission responded by creating a specific offense characteristic for
illegal re-entry cases: a four-level enhancement for defendants who
were previously deported after having been convicted of a felony
offense—other than an offense involving a violation of immigration
laws—regardless of the age of the conviction. 186 The enhancement was
unique, as the Commission had previously designed enhancements that
pertained to the way in which defendants committed the offense for
which they were being sentenced. The role of criminal history was
limited to a defendant’s criminal history score. 187 In creating the
enhancement, the Commission did not perform a study to determine if
the enhancement was needed, nor did the Commission explain the
sentencing rationale for the enhancement. 188 Thus, rather than function
in its role as an independent, expert agency, the Commission apparently
chose this particular enhancement scheme to parrot Congress’s decision
to increase the statutory-maximum penalty for illegal re-entry
defendants who had previously been convicted of a felony. 189

186. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 193 (1990) (amending § 2L1.2).
187. Previously, the only other prior conviction enhancement the Commission had created
was for alien-smuggling cases, where a defendant who had previously been convicted of the same
offense could receive a two-level enhancement because the Commission believed that committing
the same offense more than once indicated that the defendant was likely involved in “ongoing
criminal conduct.” See Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in
Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 719,
730, 736–37 (2010) [hereinafter Keller, Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements] (describing
how the Commission removed the two-level enhancement in 1992 as it found it to be an
inappropriate proxy for “ongoing criminal conduct,” but then reinstated the enhancement four
years later at the bequest of Congress).
188. See id. at 730–33 (discussing the “fundamental and unprecedented” alterations to the
illegal re-entry Guideline and the Commission’s failure to demonstrate the value of or reasoning
behind them).
189. Id. at 731–33. In defending the illegal re-entry Guideline, the Second Circuit claimed
that the Guideline is not as flawed as the much-maligned child-pornography Guideline because
the child-pornography Guideline was directly amended by Congress, whereas the illegal re-entry
Guideline was amended by the Commission and of its own volition. See United States v. PerezFrias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2011). But the Second Circuit never addressed why a Guideline
directly amended by Congress deserves less respect than a Guideline in which the Commission
merely copies what Congress did, but without a congressional order. Indeed, the Commission’s
decision to follow Congress’s lead follows its much-maligned decision to replicate Congress’s
statutory structure in creating the drug guidelines. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S 85,
96 (2007) (“The Commission did not use [an] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines
sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the [Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986’s]
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Two years later, in 1991, the Commission dramatically increased the
harshness of its prior-conviction scheme by creating a sixteen-level
enhancement for illegal re-entry defendants who had been deported
after a conviction for an “aggravated felony.” 190 The Commission
defined “aggravated felony” by relying on the term’s statutory
definition, which Congress had just changed to include money
laundering and “crime[s] of violence.” 191 Congress broadly defined a
“crime of violence” to include any “offense that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another.” 192 But such crimes, whether against
person or property, qualified as a crime of violence only if the
defendant’s “term of imprisonment” was at least five years. 193 That
qualification, however, contained a loophole: a suspended sentence
counted as a term of imprisonment. 194 Consequently, a defendant who
received no jail time and a suspended sentence of five years could be
convicted of an aggravated felony.
The Commission once again did not examine whether its new priorconviction enhancement was necessary, nor did it explain what penal
purposes it vindicated with the enhancement. 195 Rather, a single
weight-driven scheme.”). Similar to its drug-penalty scheme, Congress never ordered the
Commission to follow its lead with respect to illegal re-entry sentencing, let alone follow its lead
by making nearly all defendants who qualified for the higher statutory-maximum penalty also
qualify for an enhancement. Moreover, while Congress seemed intent on targeting a specific type
of illegal re-entry defendant—individuals who returned to the United States to continue
committing crimes—the Commission made no attempt to connect its prior-convictionenhancement scheme with that penal purpose. Indeed, Congress might have simply believed that
it would subject a large group of defendants to a statutory-maximum penalty increase and that it
was the job of the expert Commission to determine who, among that group, was most likely to reoffend and therefore deserved an actual sentencing increase. The Commission, however,
apparently did not see it that way.
190. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 375 (1992) (amending § 2L1.2(b)(1) to provide a sixteenlevel increase for defendants previously deported for aggravated felonies).
191. Id.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
193. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 375 (adding commentary to § 2L1.2 that defines
“aggravated felony” as “any crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment . . . is at
least five years”).
194. See id. (noting that the term of imprisonment imposed was independent of whether the
sentence was “suspended”).
195. See Robert J. McWhirter & Jon M. Sands, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A
Defense Perspective on Sentencing in Aggravated Felony Re-entry Cases, 8 FED. SENT’G REP.
275, 276 (1996) (“The Commission did no study to determine if such sentences [based on the
sixteen-level increase] were necessary—or desirable from any penal theory.”). The only thing the
Commission stated about the increase was this conclusory statement: “The Commission has
determined that these increased offense levels are appropriate to reflect the serious nature of these
offenses.” See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 375 (1991) (adding the offense characteristic that
provided an increase of sixteen levels above the base offense level under §2L1.2 for defendants
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commissioner suggested the enhancement, and it was passed with “little
discussion” 196 and with the support of DOJ, which believed the change
was needed to reflect congressional will. 197
The Commission’s lack of explanation was particularly peculiar
given that the enhancement was unquestionably extraordinary when
compared with the rest of the Guidelines and the way in which every
other federal crime was treated. As noted earlier, the idea of a priorconviction enhancement itself was something of a novelty. But the fact
that the new enhancement included such a dramatic increase made the
enhancement all the more exceptional. 198 Elsewhere in the Guidelines,
the Commission typically used enhancements that modestly increased a
defendant’s base level by one to six levels. 199 Of the limited number of
enhancements that could trigger a greater than six-level enhancement,
almost none could trigger a sixteen-level increase. 200 That framework

who re-entered the United States after being convicted for an aggravated felony); see also Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, San Diego, Cal., at 22 (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of
Comm’r Ruben Castillo) (“When we [the members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission] were out
in Texas, the Federal Defenders gave some, I thought, compelling testimony that said, in the first
instance, the Commission has never articulated a justification for the 16-level enhancement.”).
196. See McWhirter & Sands, supra note 195, at 276 (“Commissioner Michael Gelacak
suggested the sixteen-level increase and the Commission passed it with relatively little
discussion.”).
197. When the Commission held a hearing on its proposed amendment to the illegal re-entry
Guideline—alongside many other amendments—the illegal re-entry amendment came up only
once, by a DOJ representative who stated that DOJ supported the amendment. Public Hearing on
Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
Washington, D.C., at 31–32 (Mar. 5, 1991). In written comments in support of the illegal reentry Guideline’s alteration, DOJ stated that the amendment was needed to reflect the “will of
Congress.” Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Before the
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., at 8 (Mar. 5 1991) (statement of Joe B. Brown). The
representative noted that the amendment was “an urgent Departmental priority” and explained
that “[i]n the ordinary case, an alien drug dealer who illegally returns to the United States to
practice his trade will continue this pattern of conduct until there is a substantial disincentive to
do so.” Id. Thus, DOJ championed the enhancement under the belief that it would target
individuals who came to the United States to commit crimes.
198. See McWhirter & Sands, supra note 195, at 275 (“The 16-level adjustment is unlike any
in the guidelines. There is neither a gradual increase in severity of the offenses, such as in drug or
fraud crimes, nor is the increase pegged to a more serious element in the offense itself.”).
199. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4(b)(1) (1991) (providing a three-level enhancement for
defendants who were convicted of obstructing or impeding officers and who used “physical
contact”); U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2) (1991) (providing a four-level increase for defendants who
were convicted of criminal sexual abuse where the victim was under twelve); U.S.S.G. §
2A5.1(b)(1) (1991) (providing for a five-level increase for defendants who were convicted of
aircraft piracy where “death resulted”).
200. The lone exception was financial crimes, which typically included an enhancement
scheme that tied the money involved to the magnitude of the offense level increase. For example,
in a fraud conviction, a defendant’s base offense level of six could increase based on the amount
of loss the fraud caused; to incur a sixteen-level increase, the loss would have to total more than
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meant most enhancements added a few months to a few years to a
defendant’s sentence; the sixteen-level prior-conviction enhancement,
however, resulted in an illegal re-entrant’s sentence swelling “by
anywhere from five to fourteen times,” 201 adding from four to nine
years to a defendant’s sentence. 202 In more concrete terms, illegal reentry defendants—ostensibly being punished for a non-violent,
regulatory crime—who received the sixteen-level increase had a
Guideline range from 51 to 63 months (if the defendant was in the
lowest criminal history category) to as high as 100 to 125 months (if the
defendant was in the highest criminal history category). 203
The “proxy” problem also still existed with the Commission’s
scheme—there was a poor fit between the existence of a defendant’s
single prior conviction (no matter how dated) and the conclusion that he
or she had returned to commit crimes. But given the low number of
illegal re-entry prosecutions—in 1992, there were only around 1000
such cases 204—few total defendants in any given year received the
enhancement. Consequently, concerns about the Commission’s poorly
designed punishment scheme were mostly theoretical—at least for the
time being.
B. Targeting “Dangerous” Defendants and Placing Them on the Fast
Track (1993–2004)
Between 1993 and 2004, DOJ took the hints from Congress and
shifted strategies by making it the top priority to prosecute individuals
who had a prior conviction that triggered a prior-conviction
enhancement. In abandoning its failed deterrence strategy, DOJ took a
step forward. DOJ, however, used Congress’s poorly designed scheme
as a map to determine who should be prosecuted, thereby trading one
failed strategy that would likely never achieve its goal for another
$20,000,000. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(Q) (1991). There is a clear relationship, however, between
the amount of loss and the crime of fraud. That relationship is not clear with respect to an illegal
re-entry defendant and a prior conviction. In short, compared to the rest of the Guidelines, the
prior-conviction enhancement scheme looked different—really different. See James P. Fleissner
& James A. Shapiro, Federal Sentences for Aliens Convicted of Illegal Reentry Following
Deportation: Who Needs the Aggravation?, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 451, 462 n.57 (1995) (noting the
uniqueness of the sixteen-level enhancement for illegal re-entry cases).
201. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Improving the Guidelines through Critical Evaluation:
An Important New Role for District Courts, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 589 (2009).
202. A defendant’s adjusted offense level would go from eight to twenty-four with the
sixteen-level increase, meaning the defendant’s sentence could increase by as few as 51 months to
as many as 125 months, depending on the criminal history score. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A,
sentencing tbl. (1991).
203. Id.
204. TRAC Immigration, supra note 146.
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strategy whose goal was attainable (targeting dangerous individuals),
but improbable.
By 1993, the United States had a long-standing policy of allowing
most illegal entrants and re-entrants to return to their country of origin
through voluntary departure, in which case no order of deportation was
entered against them and they were not prosecuted. 205 Moreover, a
large number of individuals escaped apprehension altogether since the
border was still mostly unguarded. 206 According to one researcher, the
chance of being arrested trying to cross into the United States illegally
was around 30%, and successfully obtaining entry into the United States
typically took, at most, a few tries. 207 As two federal prosecutors from
Southern California summed up the situation: “Everyone—prosecutors,
aliens, defense counsel, and the court—accepted that the border was a
revolving door and that most of the aliens prosecuted as well as those
immediately returned to their country of origin would attempt to reenter
as soon as possible.” 208
This policy started to change when President Clinton made control of
the U.S.-Mexico border a top priority. 209 In 1993, President Clinton
dispatched the Attorney General and the INS Commissioner to tour the
Southwest border, where they made a “commitment to Border Patrol
that sufficient resources would be provided to permit satisfactory
management of the border.” 210

205. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 95 tbl.36
(documenting the number of “removals” and “returns” of inadmissible or deportable aliens).
206. CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE U.S.
BORDER PATROL 4 (2010) (citing a 1993 study commissioned by the Officer of National Drug
Control Policy that concluded the Southwest border was “being overrun”).
207. Thomas J. Espenshade, Does the Threat of Border Apprehension Deter Undocumented
US Immigration?, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 872, 886–88 (Dec. 1994).
208. Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 287 (1997)
[hereinafter Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law]; accord Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration
Law Enforcement in the Southern District of California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 254 (Mar./Apr.
1996) [hereinafter Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement] (“When Attorney General
Janet Reno visited San Diego in August 1993, she observed a border that was virtually out of
control.”).
209. See ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 89 (discussing Clinton’s initiatives, including hiring 600
more Border Patrol Agents and increasing INS’s budget). Many have credited President
Clinton’s sudden interest in immigration control to crass politics; an anti-immigration backlash in
California had led Clinton’s political team to worry that he was vulnerable to attack as being soft
on illegal immigration in that key electoral state. See Wayne Cornelius, Controlling ‘Unwanted’
Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD.
775, 777–78 (2005).
210. Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 299.
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The primary goal of this new strategy was “prevention through
deterrence,” whereby officials believed they could deter individuals
from unlawfully immigrating to the United States by making it more
difficult to enter the country illegally. 211 As one report stated, “[t]he
strategy’s goal was to place [Border Patrol] agents and resources
directly on the border in order to deter the entry of illegal aliens, rather
than attempting to arrest aliens after they have already entered the
country,” as had long been the understood mission of Border Patrol.212
The shift in strategy resulted in a massive investment in border assets.
The number of Border Patrol agents, for example, doubled in the
Southern District of California, one of the most popular locations for
Mexican nationals to attempt to enter the United States illegally. 213 The
agents were armed with sophisticated equipment, including night vision
scopes, radios, ground sensors, and helicopters. 214 A metal fence was
constructed in some stretches. 215 Law enforcement started to use
“IDENT,” 216 a database in which the fingerprints and photograph of
each person Border Patrol apprehended would be entered, allowing
immigration authorities to identify individuals more quickly. 217 Thus,
for the first time, immigration authorities made a dramatically increased
effort to reduce the ease with which an individual could enter the United
States illegally.
Thereafter, DOJ launched its new effort to prosecute illegal entry and
re-entry cases along the border, but “it was readily apparent,” the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of California explained, that DOJ
“could not, even were it deemed desirable, arrest, prosecute, and convict
a half million or more people annually.” 218 Thus, DOJ, with the help of
211. See ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 92; HADDAL, supra note 206, at 3–4.
212. HADDAL, supra note 206, at 3.
213. Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 299–300; ANDREAS, supra note 15,
at 90.
214. Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 299–300; ANDREAS, supra note 15,
at 90.
215. ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 91.
216. IDENT is the acronym for the Automated Biometric Identification System. See U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC
IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEM
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf. IDENT is a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-wide system for the storage and processing
of biometric and limited biographic information for DHS national security, law
enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mission-related functions, and
to provide associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or
other administrative uses.
Id.
217. See HADDAL, supra note 206, at 10–11 (discussing IDENT).
218. See Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement, supra note 208, at 254 (noting
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IDENT, focused on what it called “criminal alien[s]”—which it “guessestimated” made up 1% of the unlawful entrants and re-entrants—rather
than “the economic migrant,” who had previously made up most
prosecutions. 219 DOJ therefore abandoned the goal of using the
criminal justice system to deter illegal immigration and shifted its
resources to the 1% it believed were entering the United States to
commit crimes—the individuals Senator Chiles wanted targeted.
DOJ understood “criminal alien,” however, in light of Congress’s
definition of aggravated felony. Thus, DOJ took Congress’s (and
therefore the Commission’s) formula for identifying dangerous
individuals and used it to filter who should be prosecuted, 220 meaning
that Congress’s poorly calibrated proxy for likelihood to commit crimes
was being used not only to determine who should receive a higher
sentence, but who should be prosecuted in the first place.
DOJ’s strategy also raised a more fundamental concern—a concern
that its public comments never addressed. DOJ’s plan to use criminal
history as a proxy for determining dangerousness and then to prosecute
those who were deemed dangerous, meant illegal entrants and reentrants were not being prosecuted for their decision to illegally enter or
re-enter, as this decision alone would typically not result in their
prosecution. Rather, they would be selected for prosecution because of
what DOJ thought they might do—i.e., commit a crime. In essence,
DOJ was employing a preventive detention scheme to incapacitate
dangerous people, rather than prosecuting people to punish them for
their criminal conduct. 221 It was no different than prosecuting anyone
caught speeding who had been convicted of an aggravated felony and
giving them a lengthy sentence on the theory that they were likely to
commit a more serious offense in the future.

that up to 600,000 individuals were arrested each year at the border and nearly all could be
charged with—at the least—unlawful entry).
219. See Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 300 (explaining how the new
system allowed for more “efficient detection and identification” of those aliens who posed the
biggest threat to the U.S., thereby allowing a narrower prosecutorial focus).
220. See Susan Katzenelson, Kyle Conley & Willie Martin, Non-U.S. Citizen Defendants in
the Federal Court System, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 259, 259–60 (1996) (noting that, in fiscal year
1995, 62% of defendants sentenced under the illegal re-entry Guideline received the sixteen-level
increase).
221. As DOJ began using a preventive detention scheme in the criminal context to target
supposedly dangerous individuals, Congress mandated a preventive detention scheme in
immigration cases as well. See Legomsky, supra note 174, at 490–91 (discussing how the
grounds for mandatory detention, as opposed to discretionary detention, have multiplied since
1996, when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act only required mandatory detention for those people
convicted of “aggravated felonies”).
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Using the criminal justice system in this way is what Paul Robinson
has described as “cloaking . . . preventive detention as criminal
justice.” 222 The criminal act (speeding, illegally entering, etc.) is used
to justify placing the supposedly dangerous individual in the criminal
justice system, where the government can detain the individual based on
his or her supposed future dangerousness but “bypass the logical
restrictions on preventive detention.” 223 For example, under a true
preventive detention scheme, the government must justify the detainee’s
ongoing dangerousness on a regular basis; once a detainee can establish
that he or she is no longer a danger, the government’s interest in
detention vanishes, and the individual must be released. 224 But using
the criminal justice system as a “cloak” allows the government to avoid
having to establish that the defendant is dangerous, as well as detain
someone when they could no longer establish that they are dangerous.
That meant illegal entry and re-entry defendants could not secure their
own release by proving that they were not a danger because the criminal
justice system operated under the fiction that the defendant was being
punished for the decision to illegally enter or re-enter. This “cloaking”
is also what allowed the government to use a terrible proxy for
determining dangerousness—the prior-conviction scheme—since the
government would not be forced to justify its detention on the basis that
the individual was a danger to society. The government could instead
rely on the defendant’s conviction for illegal entry or re-entry to justify
its detention decision.
DOJ soon put its new plan into practice. The flashpoint was the
Southern District of California. Despite its desire to escalate the
number of prosecutions in that district, DOJ “recognized . . . that the
system as structured was ill equipped to handle the large number of
additional criminal alien cases,” 225 reflecting that DOJ had learned
something from its attempt in the 1970s to flood the district with
immigration prosecutions. But rather than have Congress spend more
money to pay for its new strategy, DOJ figured out a shortcut, devising
the aptly named “fast track” program—a more formalized version of the
flip-flop plan that had been used in the district starting in the 1970s. 226
Under the fast-track program, an illegal re-entry defendant received a
“charge bargain” plea offer within twenty-four hours of arraignment.227
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Robinson, supra note 178, at 1446.
Id.
Id. at 1447.
Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 300.
See supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
See Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 301 (describing this plea offer
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The offer allowed the defendant to plead guilty to illegal re-entry
without the felony or aggravated felony enhancement. Thus, the
defendant’s statutory-maximum penalty was two years, rather than ten
or twenty. 228 Alternatively, prosecutors allowed some defendants—
those with a heightened criminal history—to plead guilty to either two
counts of illegal entry, which carried a statutory maximum of two-anda-half years, or three counts, which carried a statutory-maximum
penalty of four-and-a-half years. 229 Regardless of the deal offered, the
statutory-maximum penalty would be substantially lower than it
otherwise would have been—so low, in fact, that the deals would blunt
the effect of the sixteen-level prior-conviction enhancement. Thus,
unlike defendants charged with other federal crimes, illegal re-entry
defendants would receive a special chance to receive a significant
sentencing discount (sometimes equaling several years of prison time).
as the “centerpiece” of the new fast-track program).
228. Id.
229. See Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy
Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
517, 523 (2006) (discussing this version of charge bargaining). In addition to this charge-bargain
form of fast track, the Southern District of California also allowed defendants to receive the
benefits of fast track through direct manipulation of their Guideline range. This occurred through
use of the catch-all departure provision in U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, which the Supreme Court, in Koon
v. United States, made clear authorized departures when something about the facts of a case
removed it from the “heartland” of cases. 518 U.S. 81, 94–95 (1996). Relying on this catch-all
departure, prosecutors allowed defendants to receive an offense level reduction if the defendant
met the requirements of fast track. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1169–70 (9th
Cir. 2001) (Tashima, J., concurring) (describing how the government used the catch-all departure
provision in the fast-track context), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). It is not clear
how often this form of fast track (as opposed to the charge-bargaining form of fast track) was
used. But as Judge Tashima from the Ninth Circuit commented in Ruiz, it was “highly doubtful,
to say the least, that such a departure is authorized by the Guidelines,” id. at 1169, as, among
other things, “there is no requirement in the fast track departure policy of a finding that the case
falls outside of the heartland of illegal reentry cases; indeed, the policy seems to target precisely
the run-of-the-mill, heartland case.” Id. at 1170. Interestingly, when the legality of the fast-track
program was challenged in the late 1990s and early 2000s by defendants who did not receive a
fast-track offer, courts uniformly rejected their challenges by viewing fast track strictly as a
charge-bargaining program and, therefore, as part of the Executive Branch’s significant charging
discretion. There did not appear to be any recognition that charge bargaining was not the only
way in which the government facilitated fast track. For example, the Second Circuit, in rejecting
an argument by an illegal re-entry defendant that the district court could grant a downward
departure to remedy the geographic disparity caused by fast track, quoted a Supreme Court
decision that stated “‘the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the] discretion [of the prosecutor].’” United
States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 701 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)). As discussed below, with the support of legislation passed in 2003,
the Commission made a specific departure provision for fast track, thereby obviating the need to
rely on the catch-all departure provision to facilitate fast track. See infra notes 282–84 and
accompanying text (discussing the 2003 PROTECT Act, a reformation of the previous fast-track
program of criminal pleading).
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In return, the defendant would have to, among other things: (1) waive
being indicted; (2) waive the right to file motions; (3) agree to a
sentence (usually the statutory-maximum sentence); (4) consent to
removal from the country; and (5) waive the right to appeal the
conviction, sentence, and removal order. 230 The defendant also needed
to accept or reject the offer in a relatively short timeframe. 231 This
process allowed the government to process people quickly, thereby
clearing detention bed space.
Fast-track programs quickly spread, including along the rest of the
U.S.-Mexico border where the overwhelming majority of prosecutions
occurred. 232 While the exact scope of the plea offer differed from
district to district, the basic idea remained the same: the government
allowed some defendants to receive a shorter sentence in exchange for a
quick guilty plea, which allowed the government to prosecute more
people with fewer resources. 233 The potential cost saving of a quick
guilty plea was substantial to the government. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the fast-track program,
perhaps best captured the prevailing wisdom about the program: “[W]e
find absolutely nothing wrong (and, quite frankly, a great deal right)
with [the fast-track program]. The policy benefits the government and
the court system by relieving court congestion.” 234
With the aid of fast track, the number of illegal re-entry prosecutions
reached levels not seen in decades. In 1993, DOJ prosecuted about
2000 illegal re-entry cases; in three years, that number doubled to over

230. See Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 301 (explaining that while
entering a preindictment plea agreement allowed defendants to serve less time in prison, the
practical effect of doing so was that defendants would be sent back to their country of origin
immediately upon completion of their prison term; this plea agreement was the alternative to a
protracted hearing and appeals process, which accompanied those cases where defendants were
charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006)).
231. See McClellan & Sands, supra note 229, at 532 (“[Once a prosecutor makes a fast track
plea offer,] [t]ime becomes of the essence because the deal is only held open until the deadline for
holding the preliminary and detention hearings, and to take advantage of the deal, the defendant
must waive these hearings.”).
232. Id. at 523–25.
233. See id. (describing the differences among fast-track programs and plea policies and the
resulting differences in sentencing ranges); see also Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law
Enforcement, supra note 208, at 255–57 (describing the changes in the program that occurred in
the Southern District of California and the diversity of fast-track opinions used in the Southern
District alone).
234. United States v. Estra-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995).
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4000, 235 the highest it had been since the 1950s. The number of illegal
entry cases, however, remained static, with fewer than 1000 per year. 236
In 1996, Congress once again expanded its definition of “aggravated
felony,” adding (among other crimes) gambling offenses, passport
fraud, and bribery. 237 Congress also broadened the characteristics of
the listed crimes, so that more crimes qualified as aggravated felonies.
For example, a prior conviction for a “crime of violence” (which itself
had been broadly defined to include even property crimes) previously
constituted an aggravated felony only if the sentence imposed was five
years; under the new legislation, the sentence imposed needed to be
only one year. 238 Congress added these new crimes to an almost
comically bloated list of other crimes—tax fraud, theft offenses, child
pornography, treason, and fraud, among others—that it had previously
incorporated in 1994. 239 Congress also increased the statutorymaximum penalty for illegal re-entry defendants who had been deported
following a conviction for an aggravated felony (from fifteen to twenty
years) and following a conviction for a felony (from five to ten
years). 240

235. See TRAC Immigration, supra note 146 (showing that the government prosecuted 2361
illegal re-entry cases in 1993, as opposed to 4986 in 1997).
236. See id. (showing that the government prosecuted 832 illegal entry cases in 1997, as
opposed to 801 in 1993).
237. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, § 321, 110
Stat. 3009, 627–28; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, §
439, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–78; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 130004, 108 Stat. 1796, 202–28. Congress also created another procedural device
to remove someone from the United States, the “expedited removal,” which allowed immigration
authorities—without a hearing before an immigration judge—to remove aliens from the country
when, among other things, they arrive at the border without proper documents or with fraudulent
documents. See generally David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New
Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 678–82 (2000) (analyzing the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). The
procedure was called “expedited removal” rather than “expedited deportation” because Congress
shifted terminology, calling “removals” what had previously been known as “deportation.” For
the sake of continuity, however, this Article will carry on with the term “deportation.”
238. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, 110 Stat. at 627–28 (providing
additional eleven amendments to the definition of “aggravated felony”).
239. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416,
108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)) (stating that additional
crimes included certain offenses related to RICO, ransom, and prostitution).
240. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 108 Stat. at 2023. It is not clear
what led Congress to raise the statutory maximum penalties. But, as Professor Bowman noted,
“[b]ecause few defendants ever receive the maximum possible sentence,” congressional increases
of the statutory-maximum penalty “are primarily symbolic.” Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison
Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV.
235, 250 (2005).
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The outcome of the congressional action was that more prior
convictions triggered the sixteen-level enhancement, which meant
longer prison sentences and more aliens falsely deemed “dangerous.”
Indeed, the definition of aggravated felony included many crimes that
were neither “aggravated” nor “felonies.” 241 Shoplifting or writing a
bad check, for example, could qualify as an aggravated felony. 242
Moreover, many convictions classified as aggravated felonies had likely
been punished by relatively short sentences. 243 The result was that
illegal re-entry defendants who received the sixteen-level increase likely
served more time in federal prison for their prior conviction than they
originally spent in state prison for that conviction. 244 Thus, individuals
who had criminal records—even minor ones that showed no indication
that the person was returning to the United States to commit a crime—
were being prosecuted by DOJ and then receiving a harsh sentence
because the individuals had been deemed dangerous. The cloak over
DOJ’s preventive detention scheme, however, kept aliens from
contending that they were not dangerous and therefore, should not
receive a lengthy prison term. The relevant fact for the sentencing
judge was whether the alien had previously been convicted of a
particular offense rather than whether the alien was actually dangerous.
In the wake of the latest congressional broadening of the “aggravated
felony” definition, DOJ became even more aggressive with its fast-track
program. In 1997, DOJ prosecuted about 800 illegal entry cases and
approximately 5000 illegal re-entry cases. 245 By 2000, those numbers
were approximately 4000 and 8000 respectively. 246 Sentence lengths
also reached record levels for illegal re-entry cases, as the average
241. See William J. Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors Are Felonies: The Aggravated
Felony of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 424 (2008) (“[T]he definition of
what constitutes an aggravated felony has steadily grown and now includes conduct that is neither
‘aggravated’ nor ‘felonious,’ as those words are commonly understood.”); Legomsky, supra note
174, at 485 (noting that the expansion of the term “aggravated felony” has resulted in a definition
that includes crimes that are not “aggravated or a felony”).
242. See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a
Massachusetts shoplifting conviction qualified as an aggravated felony); Anwar K. Malik, Note,
Implications of the Small v. United States Decision, 94 KY. L.J. 715, 727–28 (2005) (discussing
the story of a legal permanent resident who was convicted of writing a bad check for less than
$20, a conviction which had been deemed an aggravated felony).
243. See infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing how most defendants who
received a sixteen-level increase had served less than two years for their aggravated felony).
244. As noted above, defendants who received the sixteen-level increase could see their illegal
re-entry Guideline range increase by between four and nine years. See supra note 202.
245. See TRAC Immigration, supra note 146 (showing that illegal entry prosecutions
increased by 240 cases between 1996 and 1997).
246. See id. (showing that since 2000, the number of illegal re-entry prosecutions has
continued to steadily increase).

ARTICLE_2_KELLER.DOCX

112

11/6/2012 11:19 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

illegal re-entry defendant received a sentence of three years, doubling
what the sentence had been a decade before. 247 This surge occurred
because approximately 60% of illegal re-entry defendants received the
sixteen-level increase, 248 confirming that DOJ was primarily targeting
individuals who had a prior conviction that triggered the sixteen-level
increase.
Figures 3 and 4, below, compare the illegal entry and re-entry
prosecutions and deportable aliens apprehended between 1987 and
2004, respectively.
FIGURE 3

Illegal Entry and Re-entry Prosecutions
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FIGURE 4

Deportable Aliens Apprehended
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247. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.50 (2000) (documenting the mean and median sentences of offenders who had been sentenced
under the immigration guidelines for fiscal year 2000).
248. Katzenelson, supra note 220, at 259.
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Apart from prosecutions, the government continued its “prevention
through deterrence” program. As a result, by 2000, Congress doled out
over a billion dollars per year for Border Patrol’s budget, 249 an increase
of more than $650 million from the 1993 budget. 250 The number of
agents increased, and physical barriers dotted the Southwest border.251
Entering the United States illegally had become substantially more
difficult.
Two notable collateral consequences resulted from the placement of
more Border Patrol agents along the border. First, immigrants started to
more heavily “rel[y] on alien smugglers” and alien smuggling
organizations, which were becoming increasingly “sophisticated,
complex, organized, and flexible.” 252 Such services also became
increasingly expensive, as the inflation-adjusted cost of a smuggler
grew on average between 6% to 8% per year, reaching around $2,000
per person by 2000. 253 Second, since Border Patrol’s enforcement
efforts were mostly focused near urban areas, immigrants started to
cross into the U.S. via dangerous patches of desert, particularly those
near Tucson. 254 This change was catastrophic for many—by 2000, over
300 migrants a year died trying to enter the United States illegally. 255
In short, apart from the threat of prosecution, both the cost and risk of
an illegal entry attempt multiplied.

249.
250.
251.
252.

HADDAL, supra note 206, at 6.
ANDREAS, supra note 15, at 89.
Id. at 90–91.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALIEN SMUGGLING: MANAGEMENT AND
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ADDRESS GROWING PROBLEM 6–7 (May 2000). In
response, DOJ started to make prosecuting alien smugglers a higher priority. Id. at 12. Thus, by
2000, DOJ prosecuted nearly 3000 alien smuggling cases per year, almost 2.5 times the number
of cases prosecuted a decade earlier. See Convictions for 2010, Lead Charge: 08 USC 1324 –
Bringing In and Harboring Certain Aliens, TRAC, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/
9x204dac 373029.html (report generated Apr. 18, 2011) (charting the number of alien smuggling
prosecutions from 1990 through 2010).
253. Bryan Roberts et al., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling
Costs along the Southwest Border 5 (Office of Immigration Statistics, Working Paper, Nov.
2010); see Pia M. Orrenius, Illegal Immigration and Enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico Border:
An Overview, FED. RES. BANK OF DALL. ECON. & FIN. REV. FIRST QUARTER 7 (2001)
(documenting the increase in smuggler use rates and fees from 1965 to 1997).
254. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: BORDER-CROSSING
DEATHS HAVE DOUBLED SINCE 1995; BORDER PATROL’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT DEATHS HAVE
NOT BEEN FULLY EVALUATED 3–4 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter BORDER-CROSSING DEATHS HAVE
DOUBLED SINCE 1995] (“The increase in deaths due to heat exposure over the last 15 years is
consistent with our previous report that found that evidence that migrant traffic shifted from
urban areas like San Diego and El Paso into the desert following the implementation of the
Southwest Border Strategy in 1994.”).
255. Id. at 16.
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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were widespread
complaints about both the fast-track program and the Commission’s
prior-conviction scheme. Fast track was attacked as arbitrary, since the
program varied across districts, and many districts—approximately
half 256—did not have a program at all, meaning a defendant’s sentence
could be “radically different” depending on the place of
apprehension. 257 For example, an illegal re-entry defendant in Criminal
History Category V received a plea offer of twenty-four months if
caught in San Diego (which had a fast-track program), a plea offer of
thirty months if caught in San Francisco (which had a different fasttrack program), and a plea offer of seventy to eighty-seven months if
caught in Los Angeles (which had no fast-track program). 258 The
disparity that had led to sentencing reform in the 1980s was being
resuscitated.
The fast-track program was also assailed for turning criminal
proceedings into an “assembly-line,” 259 a criticism that echoed Judge
Schwartz’s concerns about the 1970s flip-flop program. 260 Perhaps the
most concerning aspect of the program was the short amount of time
prosecutors gave defendants to accept a fast-track offer. Often,
defendants merely had days to decide whether to accept their fast-track
offer. The situation placed defense counsel in a difficult ethical position
when attempting to advise their clients. As two former federal public
defenders explained the quandary in a 1999 article:
You must try to explain [in your initial meeting with clients] that
pleading guilty and doing so quickly, in most cases, is going to result
in the lowest penalty. You must do this without the benefit of any
investigation into the legal and factual issues, often with little or no
discovery from the government [to determine if the client has a
defense]. You must do it without adequate time to develop any
relationship with the client. And unless you are bilingual and speak

256. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 64 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES] (stating that approximately half of the U.S. Districts did not
implement the fast-track program).
257. Jon M. Sands, Avoiding “Hobson’s Choice”—Disparity in Plea Policies as a Departure
Basis, 23 CHAMPION 55, 56 (July 1999); see McClellan & Sands, supra note 229, at 524–25
(discussing the “patchwork quality” of plea policies across jurisdictions).
258. See Sands, supra note 257, at 56.
259. Daniel P. Blank, Note, Suppressing Defendant’s Identity and Other Strategies for
Defending against a Charge of Illegal Reentry after Deportation, 50 STAN. L. REV. 139, 142
(1997).
260. Id. at 158–59.
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your client’s language, you may be doing it in a language other than
his native tongue. 261

The idea of a defense in an illegal entry or re-entry case might appear
to be an oxymoron. The crimes are, for the most part, simple ones.
Defendants are typically caught red-handed—i.e., in the act of illegally
entering at the U.S.-Mexico border. But there are two technical
defenses even for defendants caught red-handed.
First, a complete defense to a charge of illegal entry or re-entry is a
claim of U.S. citizenship, since only “aliens” (non-U.S. citizens) can be
convicted of illegal entry and re-entry. 262 Sometimes an individual will
know if he or she is a U.S. citizen; other times, however, an individual
will not. For example, some individuals are “derivative” citizens,
individuals who automatically became U.S. citizens (even though they
were born outside of the United States) because they derived citizenship
through a U.S. citizen parent. 263
Second, illegal re-entry defendants can collaterally attack the legality
of their predicate deportation order. In 1987, in United States v.
Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
guarantee of due process allowed an administrative order, like an order
of deportation, to comprise an element of a criminal offense only if the
defendant could, at some point, attain judicial review of the legality of
the order. 264 The Court further held that “where the defects in an
administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding,
an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made
available before the administrative order may be used to establish
conclusively an element of a criminal offense.” 265 Applying those
principles to the case before it, the Court held that judicial review had
not been previously available to Mendoza-Lopez in his immigration
proceeding, given the defects of the earlier proceeding. MendozaLopez had failed to seek judicial review of the immigration judge’s
deportation order earlier only because the immigration judge had
incorrectly told him that he was not eligible for relief from
deportation. 266 As a result, he could obtain judicial review of the

261. Michael O’Connor & Celia Rumann, The Death of Advocacy in Re-Entry after
Deportation Cases, 23 CHAMPION 42, 42–43 (Nov. 1999).
262. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (2006).
263. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (g) (2006) (defining derivative citizenship requirements).
264. 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987).
265. Id. at 838.
266. Id. at 842. He had been eligible for “suspension of deportation,” a form of relief. Id. at
841.
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legality of his deportation order in his illegal re-entry prosecution.267
Subsequently, Congress essentially codified the Court’s holding at 8
U.S.C. § 1326(d). 268
Both defenses can require time-consuming research. 269 Determining
whether someone has a potential derivative-citizenship defense may
involve significant legal research into the changing derivative
citizenship requirements and factual research into the defendant’s
history. 270 For example, the determination can require research into
how long a defendant’s U.S. citizen parent lived in the United States
before giving birth to the defendant. 271 To determine whether a
defendant has a valid collateral attack, the defendant’s attorney typically
must review what happened at the defendant’s deportation hearing,
which requires listening to an audiotape of the hearing. In listening to
the tape, the attorney must determine whether the hearing involved a
due process violation, such as whether the defendant qualified for some
sort of relief from deportation that the immigration judge did not
mention. 272 With the fast-track program, however, a defendant must
quickly accept the plea bargain, meaning he or she will not necessarily
have enough time to determine whether a potential defense exists,
thereby creating the aforementioned ethical dilemma for defense
attorneys.
In addition to complaints about the fast-track program, defense
counsel, commentators, and judges assailed the Commission’s prior267. Id. at 842.
268. Act of Apr. 24, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1267 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1326(d) (1996)). Courts have interpreted the standard to mean not only that the defendant was
eligible for relief, but that he or she had at least a reasonable chance of receiving such relief. See
Wible, supra note 14, at 467–80 (explaining various circuit courts’ interpretations of the
standard).
269. Determining a defendant’s sentencing exposure in illegal re-entry cases can also take
some time because of the categorical approach, which might require a defendant’s attorney to
obtain copies of the defendant’s conviction records and do significant legal research. See AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) (1988)); see also supra note 172 (discussing the categorical approach).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 724–27 (9th Cir. 2011)
(vacating an illegal re-entry defendant’s conviction after determining that the district court had
improperly required the defendant to prove he was a derivative citizen rather than requiring the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not a derivative citizen and,
therefore, an alien).
271. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006) (defining which persons are United States nationals at
birth if born outside the geographical limits of the United States when one parent is a United
States citizen and the other is an alien).
272. To competently do so requires a familiarity with immigration law and the various types
of relief available. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006) (providing the requirements for
withholding of removal); id. § 1229b(a) (providing the requirements for cancellation of removal);
id. § 1229c(b) (providing the requirements for voluntary departure).
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conviction scheme. The scheme was derided for its harshness and lack
of proportionality. Judges, for example, were concerned that the broad
definition of “aggravated felony” resulted in too many defendants
receiving the sixteen-level increase for relatively trivial conduct. 273 At
least some judges “believed that a good number of . . . prior aggravated
felonies were nonviolent, and [decisions to return to the United States
illegally] were motivated by family separation circumstances rather than
sinister criminal intentions.” 274
Thus, judges complained about
Congress’s proxy for determining who was returning to the United
States to commit crimes, particularly serious crimes. Indeed, the
Commission’s own research indicated that over half of all aggravated
felonies that triggered the sixteen-level increase did not involve injury,
violence, or a weapon. 275 Over 80% of the prior aggravated felony
convictions also involved sentences that fell well below the four-ormore years the sixteen-level increase added to the sentence of illegal reentry defendants. 276
In response to these complaints, the Commission studied how it could
improve illegal re-entry sentencing. 277 Ultimately, the Commission
chose to re-craft its scheme so that the illegal re-entry Guideline had a
more graduated penalty increase. Rather than just having four- and
sixteen-level increases, the Commission created eight- and twelve-level
increases. 278 The four-level increase would continue to be triggered by
a felony prior conviction, the eight-level increase would be triggered by
a prior conviction for an aggravated felony, and the twelve-level
increase would be triggered by a drug trafficking conviction for which
the sentence imposed was thirteen months or less. 279 Finally, the
Commission re-defined the sixteen-level increase to include a broad
array of crimes, including “drug trafficking offenses (for which the
sentence imposed was more than thirteen months),” as well as “murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses
273. See Linda Drazga Maxfield, Aggravated Felonies and § 2L1.2 Immigration Unlawful
Reentry Offenders: Simulating the Impacts of Proposed Guideline Amendments, 11 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 527, 530 (2003) (explaining the general judicial dissatisfaction with the broad definition
of “aggravated felony,” particularly among judges within the southwestern districts).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 542.
276. See id. at 535 (noting that, according to the Commission’s research, in one sample of
defendants who received the sixteen-level increase, 83% had served less than two years for their
aggravated felony).
277. See id. at 531 (noting that the Commission, in response to “concerns” about its priorconviction scheme, “identified the unlawful entry guideline § 2L1.2 consideration during its 2001
amendment cycle”).
278. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 632 (2001).
279. Id.
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(including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion,
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling, or any other
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against another person.” 280
Disappointingly, the Commission’s new scheme never addressed
what purpose the prior-conviction enhancement was intended to serve.
Was it intended to target individuals who planned to come to the United
States to commit crimes, as Senator Chiles had suggested in 1988 and as
DOJ had assumed? If so, why was the scheme still not tailored to target
those sorts of individuals?
Apart from these questions, the Commission also failed to address the
proportionality concerns commentators had raised. Even if the scheme
were tailored to target individuals who were likely to commit crimes,
why was criminal propensity the most important factor in an illegal reentry defendant’s sentence? Put more concretely, why should prior
shoplifting, robbery, or assault convictions not just be a factor in
sentencing an illegal re-entry defendant, but the most important factor?
And, if such a prior conviction should be the most important factor, why
should it ever have the ability to add nearly a decade to an illegal reentry defendant’s sentence? Did a former robbery conviction really
make the act of illegally re-entering so much worse that it justified
increasing a defendant’s sentence from two years to ten?
In short, while the Commission’s re-sculpting made the illegal reentry Guideline less harsh on average, the Commission’s amendment
failed to provide much-needed legitimacy to the Guideline. The
amendment, then, underscored the idea that illegal re-entry defendants,
unlike every other type of federal defendant, would mostly be punished
for what they had previously done, rather than for the immigration
crime for which they had been convicted. 281
With the illegal re-entry Guideline slightly reformed, a response to
complaints about the fast-track program came next. In 2003, Congress
passed the PROTECT Act, which focused on efforts to reduce the
number of downward departures. 282 The Act also included a single
280. Id. By 2006, around 40% of the defendants sentenced for illegal re-entry received the
sixteen-level enhancement; 8% received the twelve-level enhancement; 18% received the eightlevel enhancement; and 14% received the four-level enhancement. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
INTERIM STAFF REPORT ON IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 22 (Jan. 20, 2006). About 20% received no prior-conviction enhancement, meaning
they have never been convicted of a felony offense. Id.
281. For my full critique of the illegal re-entry Guideline, see generally Keller, Prior
Conviction Sentencing Enhancements, supra note 187.
282. See PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); see also Thomas E. Gorman, Fast-Track Sentencing
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sentence concerning fast track, giving the Commission 180 days to
promulgate “a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of
not more than [four] levels if the Government files a motion for such
departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the
Attorney General and the United States Attorney.” 283 Thus, Congress
expressly blessed a certain kind of fast-track program and delegated to
the Attorney General the responsibility of working out the details. The
Act’s primary sponsor, Representative Tom Feeney, stated that the
program was needed “to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
within a given district” by requiring that departure be made “pursuant to
a formal program that is approved by the United States Attorney and
that applies generally to a specified class of offenders.” 284
Later that year, Attorney General Ashcroft released a memorandum
setting out criteria for fast-track programs. 285 According to Ashcroft,
the programs would be “reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as
where the resources of a district would otherwise be significantly
strained by the large volume of a particular category of cases.”286
Ashcroft, however, never addressed the disparity caused by the fasttrack program—nor did he address the complaints about requiring
defendants to quickly accept a plea offer without having adequate time
to know whether they were even guilty of the crime to which they were
pleading. 287
Shortly after, the Commission issued a report concerning the general
state of downward departures post-PROTECT Act. With respect to the
Act’s approval of the fast-track program, the Commission wrote that it
hoped that requiring the Attorney General to approve “all early
disposition programs . . . will bring about greater uniformity and
transparency among those districts that implement authorized
Disparity: Rereading Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479,
488–90 (2010) (discussing the PROTECT Act and its purposes).
283. PROTECT Act of 2003, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 675.
284. 149 CONG. REC. H2403, H2421 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003).
285. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department’s
“Fast-Track” Policies (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 134–35 (Dec.
2003).
286. Id. at 134.
287. Thus, even after Ashcroft’s memorandum, defense attorneys continued to complain that
they did not have enough time to advise their clients or determine whether their clients had a
potentially meritorious defense to an illegal re-entry charge. See Erin T. Middleton, Fast-Track
to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing Policies along the Southwest Border Are Undermining the
Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827, 834–35
(discussing the difficulty of exploring possible defenses in a short period of time, particularly in
the immigration context, where most of the information necessary to make such a determination
is in the hands of the government).
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programs.” 288 The report also expressed reservations about such
programs, stating that the “geographical disparity” it encouraged
“appears to be at odds with the overall Sentencing Reform Act goal of
reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated
offenders.” 289 The report further expressed concern that “sentencing
courts within districts that establish authorized early disposition
programs may not have sufficient guidance to apply the departure
provision in a uniform manner.” 290 Nevertheless, the Commission
ultimately promulgated a policy statement that did no more than track
the language from the PROTECT Act. 291
Unsurprisingly, as a consequence of the Ashcroft memorandum and
the Commission’s refusal to provide uniform structure to the fast-track
program, the status quo persisted, as DOJ continued to institute fasttrack programs in a haphazard fashion. Districts in Oregon, Idaho,
Nebraska, and North Dakota, for example, were authorized to have fasttrack programs, even though these districts saw only two or three illegal
re-entry cases per prosecutor per year. 292
The Commission’s recrafting of its prior-conviction scheme and the
blessing of DOJ’s fast-track programs had two predictable results: (1)
more illegal entry and re-entry prosecutions; and (2) decreased average
sentence lengths for illegal re-entry cases. In 2001, DOJ prosecuted
over 8000 illegal re-entry cases. 293 Defendants sentenced under the
illegal re-entry Guideline received an average sentence of thirty-five
months. 294 Just three years later, in 2004, DOJ prosecuted over 13,000
illegal re-entry cases. 295 Defendants sentenced under the illegal reentry Guideline in 2004 received an average sentence of twenty-nine
months. 296 The number of illegal entry prosecutions followed a similar

288. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 256, at 66.
289. Id. at 67.
290. Id.
291. See U.S.S.G., app. C, amend. 651 (2003) (“Upon motion of the Government, the court
may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized
by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the district in
which the court resides.”).
292. See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting
where DOJ had instituted fast-track programs); see also United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581
F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t does not appear to be clear to the Commission (based on its
limited statistical analysis), nor is it evident to us, why some districts have fast-track programs
while others do not.”).
293. See TRAC Immigration, supra note 146.
294. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.50
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS].
295. See TRAC Immigration, supra note 146.
296. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 294, at tbl.50
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pattern. In 2001, there were about 3500 illegal entry convictions; by
2004, there were about 18,000. 297 With additional cases, the criminal
detention costs soared: the government’s annual incarceration costs for
illegal entry and re-entry cases ballooned from approximately $72
million in 1994 to $576 million by 2004—an incredible eight-fold
increase in just one decade. 298
Alien-smuggling organizations also continued to proliferate, as more
and more immigrants chose to hire someone to guide them into the
United States. 299 The average inflation-adjusted cost of an alien
smuggler also continued to rise. 300 Moreover, hundreds of migrants
continued to die each year trying to enter the United States illegally
through perilous stretches of desert. 301 Consequently, it was becoming
even more expensive and dangerous for many individuals to enter the
United States illegally.
III. THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS: TARGETING “DANGEROUS”
ALIENS AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DETERRENCE
RATIONALE (2005–PRESENT)
This final Part brings us to the present day, where eighty years of
policy missteps with respect to the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry
have culminated in an unprecedented crisis in the administration of
federal criminal justice—a crisis that so far has received only modest
attention. Starting in 2005, immigration officials launched “Operation
Streamline” so that the government could prosecute as many illegal
entry and re-entry cases as possible, in an attempt to deter illegal
immigration. In essence, immigration officials have resurrected their
prior view of the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry along lengthy
stretches of the U.S.-Mexico border. But unlike earlier attempts, this
one has resulted in a colossal growth in the number of prosecutions—
approximately 72,000 a year, a number that constitutes almost half of all

(documenting the number of pre- and post-Blakely sentencings for illegal re-entry).
297. See Convictions for 2010, Lead Charge: 08 USC 1325 – Entry of alien at improper time
or place; etc., TRAC, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x204d6ba57d03.html (report generated Feb.
28, 2011) (documenting illegal entry convictions from 1990 to 2010).
298. ALISTAIR GRAHAM ROBERTSON ET AL., OPERATION STREAMLINE: COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 24 tbl.3 (2012) [hereinafter OPERATION STREAMLINE], available at http://
grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf.
299. See Roberts, supra note 253, at 5, 9 (analyzing the rise of migrant smuggling).
300. See id. at 5 (documenting the rise of real average costs of smuggling Mexican nationals
from four data sources).
301. See BORDER-CROSSING DEATHS HAVE DOUBLED SINCE 1995, supra note 254, at 16
(noting an increase in deaths due to heat exposure over the last fifteen years).
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federal prosecutions. 302 The federal government has accomplished this
feat by spending massive amounts of money—$5.5 billion on detention
costs alone from 2005 through 2011—and by drastically reducing the
criminal process afforded defendants along much of the U.S.-Mexico
border to the extent that the resulting criminal proceedings are
unrecognizable as such in the rest of the country. 303 The government
has also overwhelmed district courts along the border and forced law
enforcement personnel to abandon attempts at dealing with much more
serious crimes. Despite this huge growth in prosecutions, it is doubtful
that the use of the criminal justice system has meaningfully deterred
individuals from coming to the United States illegally and only a small
fraction of apprehended deportable aliens continue to be prosecuted. In
short, DOJ has resurrected its ineffectual deterrence strategy, just with a
heftier price tag, and combined it with its failed policy of targeting
dangerous aliens.
A. The Booker Detour
Before turning to the launch of Operation Streamline, a quick detour
must be taken to note the dramatic change in federal sentencing that has
cast a shadow over illegal re-entry sentencing. In 2005, the Supreme
Court, in Booker v. United States, held that the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines could violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury; to eliminate the possibility of a violation, the Court excised the
statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory. 304 The result
was a statutory regime that requires judges to “consider” the Guideline
range, along with deterrence, just deserts, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation when sentencing a defendant. 305 Thus, rather than being
bound by the Guideline range, judges are now bound by the statutory
minimum and maximum penalties, and they must consider various
sentencing factors (including the Guideline range) in selecting a
sentence between those two bookends. 306

302. See infra note 347 and accompanying text (stating that the growth in prosecutions has
reached 72,000 per year).
303. See OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 3 (“Since the announcement of
Operation Streamline in 2005, the federal government has spent $5.5 billion incarcerating
undocumented immigrants in the criminal justice system for unauthorized entry and re-entry,
above and beyond the civil immigration system.”).
304. 543 U.S. 220, 232–37, 245 (2005).
305. Id. app. at 268–70.
306. Reviewing courts must also ensure that the judge’s selected sentence is not substantively
unreasonable—i.e., too long or too short. See, e.g., United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539, 549
(6th Cir. 2009) (outlining the factors that a reviewing court may consider in determining whether
the district court’s sentence was substantively reasonable); United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308,
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With the Guidelines rendered advisory, illegal re-entry defendants are
now free to argue to district court judges that the judges should remedy
some of the defects in illegal re-entry sentencing. In particular,
defendants have contended that judges should use their post-Booker
discretion to give them below-Guideline sentences to make up for the
unwarranted disparity between these defendants and defendants who
had the option of accepting a fast-track offer. 307 Some circuits have
held that such arguments are permissible, while others have held that
they are not. 308
In January 2012, DOJ weighed in on this dispute. 309 In a
memorandum penned by a deputy attorney general, DOJ noted that
prosecutors “in non-fast-track districts routinely face motions for
variances based on fast-track programs in other districts.” 310 In
response, DOJ created, for the first time, a national fast-track policy
whereby all districts, rather than a haphazard collection of districts,
would have an illegal re-entry fast-track program. 311 While DOJ should
be applauded for recognizing that significant geographic disparity in a
national criminal justice system is a problem worth addressing, DOJ
should receive little credit for its solution. The new national policy does
little to address geographic disparity, as each of the ninety-three U.S.
Attorneys has been granted wide discretion to make large numbers of

1311 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding the district court’s sentence substantively reasonable). Thus, the
judge must select a sentence within the statutory range that is not unreasonably long in light of
the sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a) of 18 U.S.C.
307. See Gorman, supra note 282, at 499–507 (detailing how certain courts of appeal have
reassessed their fast-track precedent post-Kimbrough).
308. For example, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court has discretion to determine that
the geographic disparity caused by fast track constituted “unwarranted sentencing disparity”—a
statutory sentencing consideration—and, therefore, sentencing judges could use their post-Booker
sentencing discretion to give a defendant a below-Guideline sentence to remedy that disparity.
United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485, 491–93 (10th Cir. 2011). To receive such a
variance, however, the court noted that the defendant “must make a minimum showing that a
defendant charged with the same crime in a fast-track district would qualify for fast-track
treatment.” Id. at 494. Other circuits, however, have held that the geographic disparity caused by
fast track is not “unwarranted sentencing disparity” within the meaning of the Sentencing Reform
Act because Congress blessed fast track in the PROTECT Act. See Gorman, supra note 282, at
499–504 (citing United States v Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2008)) (discussing the
reasoning employed by courts of appeal that have held that district courts may not remedy the
geographic disparity caused by the fast-track program); United States v Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556
F.3d 736, 739–40 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that district courts may not consider geographic fasttrack disparities in sentencing because non-fast-track districts are not “unwarranted”).
309. See generally Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S.
Attorneys regarding Dep’t Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-Track” Programs (Jan. 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf.
310. Id. at 2.
311. Id. at 3–4.
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illegal re-entry defendants ineligible for fast track based on factors like
criminal history and prior immigration contacts. 312 The national policy,
then, is really one of local control with significant local variation. The
result has been that districts around the country have developed
significantly different policies, and similarly situated defendants still
receive vastly different sentences depending on the place of
apprehension. 313 Moving forward, the place of apprehension will still
be a primary factor in determining an illegal re-entry defendant’s
sentence, and district courts will still face regular requests for belowGuideline sentences based on geographic disparity in illegal re-entry
cases.
In light of Booker, illegal re-entry defendants have also raised policy
challenges to the Commission’s prior-conviction scheme, claiming that
the enhancement results in an unjust and flawed Guideline range that
should be given little weight in the sentencing calculus. 314 Some judges
have been sympathetic to the idea that the prior-conviction scheme
results in a Guideline range that is too long in at least some cases. 315
Thus, judges, in an ad-hoc fashion, have sometimes remedied the
unfairness of the prior-conviction enhancements. 316 At least some
312. See id. at 3 (defining the bases upon which U.S. Attorneys can exercise their discretion).
313. For a look at the wide diversity of fast-track policies adopted by U.S. Attorneys around
the country, see generally OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERVS., MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ILLEGAL
REENTRY FAST-TRACK PROGRAM (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://fd.org/docs/select-topics--sentencing/Fast-Track-Policies.pdf.
314. See Keller, Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements, supra note 187, at 764 n.282
(cataloguing cases). See also United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by not giving the defendant a belowGuideline sentence, given the fact that the prior conviction that triggered the sixteen-level
increase occurred over twenty years prior).
315. See Keller, Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements, supra note 187, at 764 n.282.
According to the Commission, district court judges give illegal re-entry defendants a belowGuideline sentence based on their post-Booker discretion in about 8% of cases. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.50 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS] (displaying offenders’
sentence lengths under immigration guidelines pursuant to the Guideline range).
316. It is worth noting that the Commission has recently attempted to mitigate the harshness
of the illegal re-entry Guideline. In November 2011, an amendment took effect that modified the
Guideline such that, if a prior conviction that triggered the sixteen-level enhancement occurred
more than fifteen years ago (more specifically, if the conviction did not qualify for criminal
history points), under the amendment the conviction would increase the defendant’s Guideline
range by twelve levels rather than sixteen; similarly, a conviction that occurred more than fifteen
years ago and that would have triggered the twelve-level enhancement would increase the
defendant’s Guideline range by eight levels rather than by twelve. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend.
754 (2011). According to the justification accompanying the amendment, the Commission
adopted the amendment in response to “case law and public comment,” particularly the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, which held that an illegal re-entry
defendant’s within-Guideline range sentence was substantively unreasonable because the range
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judges have refused to give a below-Guideline sentence based on the
endemic shortcomings of the illegal re-entry Guideline because the
shortcomings are endemic: If such policy challenges were accepted, a
below-Guideline sentence would need to be given in nearly every
case. 317
In short, the upshot of Booker, at least with regard to illegal re-entry
sentencing, is that district courts are now empowered to soften the
harshness of illegal re-entry sentencing—most, however, do not.
Regrettably, there appears to be little momentum to rectify the problems
of illegal re-entry sentencing beyond DOJ’s symbolic fast-track national
policy.
B. Operation Streamline
As Booker was changing the conceptual framework for sentencing,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—now in charge of
immigration matters—and DOJ were devising a radical new
immigration enforcement plan. This plan became known as Operation
Streamline and resurrected the idea that prosecuting illegal entry and reentry cases could deter illegal immigration. 318
was driven by the defendant’s two-decades old prior conviction that had trigged the sixteen-level
enhancement; the Court held that a prior conviction should not “increase[e] a defendant’s
sentence by the same magnitude irrespective of the age of the prior conviction at the time of
reentry.” 567 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009). The Commission should certainly be applauded
for taking this step. Nevertheless, it is not clear why the Commission allows a prior conviction
that occurred decades ago to increase an illegal re-entry defendant’s Guideline range by any
amount.
317. For example, in United States v. Almendares-Soto, the defendant objected to the
underlying reasonableness of the illegal re-entry Guideline, noting the “radical[]” changes the
Commission had made to the Guideline. No. CR 10-1922, 2010 WL 5476767, at *3 (D.N.M.
Dec. 14, 2010). The court ultimately rejected the defendant’s request for a below-Guideline
sentence on this basis, noting that if the court accepted his argument, “a large number of
defendants would also qualify for variance of indeterminate lengths, and the Guidelines would
cease to provide an objective standard for uniformity between similarly situated defendants.” Id.
at *14. While it is perhaps understandable to want to avoid an ad-hoc solution to a system-wide
problem, sentencing courts are still statutorily required to give defendants sentences that are not
greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
(defining the factors to be considered when imposing a sentence). Thus, until a system-wide
solution to the illegal re-entry Guideline is implemented, courts must, on an ad-hoc basis, ensure
that the shortcomings of the illegal re-entry Guideline are not leading them to give defendants
sentences that are greater than necessary. Moreover, the illegal re-entry Guideline’s “objective
standard” is wholly arbitrary—it does not ensure that like cases are treated alike. It merely gives
the appearance of uniformity. Thus, by varying from the Guideline range in illegal re-entry cases,
courts are not fostering unwarranted sentencing disparity any more than they are by following the
Guideline to begin with.
318. See DHS Launches “Operation Streamline II,” U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION
(Dec.
16,
2005),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news
_releases/archives/2005_press_releases/122005/12162005.xml (announcing the launch of

ARTICLE_2_KELLER.DOCX

126

11/6/2012 11:19 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

The genesis of Operation Streamline is credited to immigration
officials working near the small Texas town of Eagle Pass around
2005. 319 For many years, Eagle Pass immigration officials struggled
with a lack of detention space, mostly because of the detention needs of
non-Mexican nationals. While apprehended Mexican nationals could be
sent back to Mexico quickly via voluntary departure, it could take
immigration officials several months to remove non-Mexican
nationals. 320
As the bed-space shortage became more acute,
immigration officials started paroling large numbers of non-Mexican
nationals into the United States (pending resolution of their immigration
cases). Eventually, word spread that non-Mexican nationals could enter
the United States through parole in Eagle Pass. 321
At first, Eagle Pass immigration officials went to the local U.S.
Attorney and asked if he would agree to prosecute all non-Mexican
nationals apprehended near Eagle Pass. Doing so, officials claimed,
would free up immigration-detention bed space by funneling individuals
into the criminal justice system, which had access to more beds. 322 The
local U.S. attorney “‘took one look’ at the plan and declined to
participate, informing the Border Patrol that prosecuting people on the
basis of national origin would be a potential equal protection
violation.” 323 Eventually, a solution to the equal protection problem
was devised: prosecute everyone apprehended for illegal entry or reentry, regardless of nationality.
Not long after the plan was
implemented, the number of apprehensions near Eagle Pass decreased
and DHS declared its program a success. 324
Operation Streamline quickly spread along the border, as first-time
offenders with no criminal history—the “economic migrants” who, DOJ
had determined in 1993, were no longer worth prosecution

Operation Streamline in Del Rio, Texas in December 2005); see also GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP,
OPERATION STREAMLINE: DROWNING JUSTICE AND DRAINING DOLLARS ALONG THE RIO
GRANDE 3 (July 2010) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP] (discussing the beginning and
proliferation of Operation Streamline). For an excellent on-the-ground view of Operation
Streamline, see generally Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CAL. L. REV. 481 (2010).
319. Lydgate, supra note 318, at 491–92.
320. Id. Mexican nationals could be quickly sent back to Mexican through an expedited
removal. Id. See generally Martin, supra note 237 (discussing the genesis of expedited
removals).
321. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 492 (explaining how Border Patrol officers were forced
to release many non-Mexican nationals merely with Notices to Appear in immigration court).
322. Id. at 493.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 494.
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resources325—would now once again star in DOJ’s criminalprosecution production. 326 But how? Nearly sixty years earlier,
immigration officials had claimed they wanted to prosecute enough
illegal entrants and re-entrants to deter illegal immigration, but they
were stifled by the lack of resources. To attempt to solve this perpetual
problem, DHS and DOJ planned to build on the earlier fast-track and
flip-flop strategies of making it “cheaper” to obtain convictions by
reducing the amount of process afforded defendants. Indeed, DHS and
DOJ authorities concocted a streamlined process that once again made
Judge Schwartz look like a prophet. 327 The linchpin of the system was
the magistrate judge, who likely owed her existence to the lobbying of
immigration officials in the 1960s. Magistrates can process the “petty”
unlawful entry cases in bulk. For example, magistrates in some areas
hold mass guilty plea hearings, where a courtroom’s worth of
defendants—at times, forty, fifty, or sixty individuals—plead guilty at
the same time. 328 In some districts, a single defense attorney represents
up to eighty defendants in one hearing. 329 Many defendants meet with
their attorney for mere minutes. 330 Because of the streamlined
procedures, many defendants “complete the entire proceeding—meeting
with counsel, making an initial appearance, pleading guilty, and being
sentenced . . . —in a single day.” 331 In some districts, cases are
prosecuted not by Assistant U.S. Attorneys, but deputized immigration
officials. 332 Some immigration officials who shepherd these cases
through the system are not even licensed attorneys. 333

325. See Bersin & Feigin, The Rule of Law, supra note 208, at 300 (explaining how the new
policy shifted focus from the economic migrant to the criminal alien).
326. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 484, 508 (noting that Operation Streamline has
fundamentally transformed U.S. border enforcement practice and that “[m]ost Operation
Streamline defendants are migrants from Mexico or Central America who have no prior criminal
convictions”).
327. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 339–40 and
accompanying text.
329. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 496 (noting that, in the Del Rio Border Patrol sector,
prosecutions are limited to eighty per day).
330. See id. at 505 (noting that, in Tucson, if an attorney receives eighty new clients in one
day, and he or she spends eight straight hours interviewing each client, the interview can last only
ten minutes); id. at 505–06 (noting that, in Del Rio, defense attorneys will often have no more
than five to ten minutes to meet with their clients).
331. See id. at 486–87 (criticizing these mass hearings as failing to comport with due process).
332. Id. at 494.
333. See Eagley, supra note 2, at 1332–33 (discussing how unlicensed Border Patrol agents
served as prosecutors in Del Rio, and how defendants would only see a licensed prosecutor if
they requested a trial).
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The substantial reduction in procedural protections for criminal
defendants is ironic in light of recent criticisms from immigration
scholars about the “asymmetry” of convergence between criminal law
and immigration law, whereby “immigration law has been absorbing the
theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with criminal
enforcement while explicitly rejecting the procedural ingredients of
criminal adjudication.” 334 To balance out this “asymmetry,” the
government has made the criminal process more akin to the process
provided in immigration proceedings, not the other way around. 335 For
example, immigration advocates have long argued that aliens in the
immigration system should have the right to a government-paid-for
attorney, just as criminal defendants do. 336 Operation Streamline,
however, has resulted in watering down the benefit of having an
attorney, since defendants might have access to their lawyer for a
fleeting period of time. 337 For example, in Laredo, Texas, immigrants
arrested over the weekend for illegal entry or re-entry and who are
processed in federal court at the beginning of the following work week,
typically can meet with their public defender for less than two
minutes. 338
Many of these procedural shortcuts are of questionable legality. The
Ninth Circuit has already held that mass guilty plea hearings violate the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the magistrate to
address the defendant “personally.” 339 As the court put it, “no judge,
334. Legomsky, supra note 174, at 469; see Stumpf, supra note 17, at 1686 (“While the
enforcement of immigration law has imported substantive criminal law norms, it has left behind
the procedural protections of criminal law.”).
335. See Eagly, supra note 2, at 1351–52 (noting the similarity between immigration
proceedings and Operation Streamline prosecutions).
336. See, e.g., John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia & Stephen Yale-Loehr, “Death is
Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 382–85 (2009)
(discussing some of the arguments in support of aliens having the right to counsel in immigration
proceedings, such as the argument that deportation is in effect a criminal punishment and not a
civil fine); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 309–13
(2000) (explaining how courts have generally concluded that immigration proceedings are civil,
and not criminal, thereby not providing defendants in such proceedings with constitutional
safeguards inherent in the criminal context, such as the right to effective counsel, but arguing that
deportation proceedings should comport with due process).
337. See generally Oversight Hearing on the “Executive Office for United States Attorneys”
Before the H. Subcomm. of Commercial and Admin. Law, 110th Cong. 10–16 (June 25, 2008)
(amended written statement of Heather E. Williams) [hereinafter Williams Statement]
(cataloguing the numerous legal and ethical problems of Operation Streamline).
338. See OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 14 (explaining that public defenders in
Laredo only have two hours to meet with twenty-five to seventy-five clients, giving each client
around two minutes).
339. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009).
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however alert, could tell whether every single person in a group of 47 or
50 affirmatively answered her questions when the answers were taken at
the same time.” 340 Despite this problem, these “cattle-call” proceedings
lamentably continue. 341 Other aspects of the program are equally
concerning. Border Patrol officials who act as prosecutors “may not
adequately preserve prosecutorial independence or give due attention to
potential conflicts of interest.” 342 Moreover, many defense attorneys
who represent defendants in these proceedings are not given enough
time to defend their clients competently. 343 How, in minutes, can
counsel determine if the client is a derivative U.S. citizen and therefore
innocent of the crimes to which the client is pleading guilty? Or
whether the client has a mental illness that prevents the knowing waiver
of rights? Despite the questionable legality of many aspects of these
prosecutions, defendants exercise their constitutional rights at their own
peril, as invoking their rights just delays proceedings, so that regardless
of whether they are ultimately convicted, they will spend substantially
more time in detention than they would have if they had just quickly
waived their rights. 344
With the help of these procedural shortcuts, the number of
prosecutions has exploded. In 2005, a near-record 17,000 defendants
were convicted of illegal entry; in 2011, that number had more than
doubled to about 39,000. 345 With respect to illegal re-entry, the
government secured a then-record 11,000 convictions in 2005; in 2011,
that number had tripled to about 33,000. 346
With a total of
approximately 72,000 convictions in 2011, the federal government
almost prosecuted more illegal entry and re-entry cases than all other

340. Id.
341. See United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 1058–60 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
that Operation Streamline defendants still plead guilty en masse and once again holding that the
procedure used, despite slight changes since Roblero-Solis, is not legal).
342. Lydgate, supra note 318, at 535.
343. See Williams Statement, supra note 337, at 4, 10–16 (detailing the inadequate amount of
time available to defense attorneys to formulate a case for their clients, resulting, for example, in
cases involving prison and deportation being resolved in two days or less); OPERATION
STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 14 (“In Del Rio, attorneys usually meet with about 80 clients
over eight hours, leaving only ten minutes to meet with each Streamline defendant.”).
344. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 509 (explaining how first-time entrants are often advised
to plead guilty).
345. See Convictions for 2011, Lead Charge: 08 USC 1325 – Entry of alien at improper time
or place; etc., TRAC, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x204f7b5dc886.html (last visited May 15,
2012) (charting out the number of illegal entry convictions from 1991 through 2011).
346. See id.
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crimes combined. 347 Indeed, illegal re-entry is now the most prosecuted
federal crime. 348
Despite its stated goal, Operation Streamline has not implemented a
true “zero tolerance” policy—or even anything close to such a policy.
The Southern District of California—the second most popular location
to enter the United States illegally—has not implemented Operation
Streamline’s vision. 349
Instead, the district continues to target
individuals deemed dangerous based on Congress’ and the
Commission’s prior-conviction scheme. 350 Moreover, even across the
rest of the U.S.-Mexico border, which is ostensibly using a “zero
tolerance policy,” the government has fallen well short of its stated goal.
For example, near Del Rio, Texas—itself a popular crossing spot—the
government implements a cap of eighty prosecutions a day, since it is
not possible to process more cases. 351 In Tucson, Arizona—the most
popular place in the United States to enter illegally, where
approximately half of all apprehensions occur 352—immigration officials
can prosecute around seventy cases a day, only 8% of the nearly 900
individuals it apprehends daily for unlawful entry. 353 That “is the
maximum number of Streamline prosecutions that the Tucson district
can handle each day, given the number of holding cells in the building,
the volume of other prosecutions, and the capacity of the U.S.
Marshals.” 354 Consequently, despite the breathtaking number of total
prosecutions, an apprehended individual subject to an illegal entry or reentry charge still has an 84% chance of not being charged. 355

347. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 318, at 2.
348. See Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/251/ (last visited June 29, 2011) (charting the rise in illegal re-entry
prosecutions over the last four presidencies).
349. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 483, 484 n.13, 491, 540. In 2007, Bush Administration
officials ousted the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of San Diego, Carol Lam, because she
was choosing to prosecute fewer immigration cases and focus the office’s resources elsewhere.
Jennifer Steinhauer & Eric Lipton, Ousted California Prosecutor Previously Had Disputes on
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/politics/21lam.
html.
350. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 483, 484 n.13 (noting that rising immigration
prosecutions are the result of zero-tolerance immigration enforcement programs).
351. Id. at 496.
352. See id. at 500 (noting that the late John Roll, former Chief Judge of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona, believed that “around 45 percent of all individuals who enter the
United States illegally each year do so through the Tucson sector”).
353. See id. at 536 (noting the comments of federal defense attorneys about the procedural
problems that would occur with a higher-level of individualized attention).
354. Id. at 500.
355. See Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, supra note 348 (charting the
percentage of apprehensions prosecuted from the years 2006 to 2010).
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Among the districts attempting to implement Operation Streamline’s
vision, but which are currently prosecuting substantially less than the
total number of apprehended individuals, it is not clear whether these
districts will be able to prosecute a larger percentage of defendants
anytime soon. Border districts, in fact, are at their breaking point—well
beyond the crisis-level seen in San Diego in the 1970s. Courts and their
staffs are overwhelmed, as magistrates, court interpreters, probation
officers, pre-trial services staff, and the U.S. Marshal Service lack the
necessary personnel to deal with current caseloads. 356 These problems
are particularly acute in the District of Arizona, which recently declared
a judicial emergency—the first time a district has had to make such a
declaration in almost thirty years—because of the enormous flood of
cases. 357
The way sentencing works along the border has also varied.
Defendants with no criminal history spend, on average, between two
and fifteen days in detention; this estimate does not apply to those
apprehended outside of Tucson and Southern California, where such
defendants are not typically prosecuted. 358 The low sentence these
defendants receive is an important facet of the system. As noted above,
such a sentence essentially eliminates any incentive for a defendant to
fight the charges, since fighting would only prolong their time in
detention. 359 It also frees up bed space. Defendants with a criminal
history likewise “receive fairly divergent sentences depending on where
they are apprehended.” 360 An illegal entry defendant with some
criminal history might receive a 30-day sentence in one district and a
180-day sentence in another. 361 Illegal re-entry defendants who qualify
356. See In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 974–
75 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the problems Operation Streamline is causing for various
government officials in Arizona); see also GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 318, at 8–10
(discussing the strains placed on already limited federal resources as a result of Operation
Streamline, particularly with regards to processing and detaining an increasing number of
immigrants, which largely falls on only five of the ninety-four federal judicial districts); Lydgate,
supra note 318, at 522–24 (discussing how Operation Streamline burdens “personnel working in
the border district courts, including federal judges and their staff members, AUSAs, federal
public defenders, and U.S. Marshals”).
357. In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d at 979–80.
358. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 483, 484 n.13 (noting that zero-tolerance programs have
been implemented in six of the nine Border Patrol sectors).
359. For example, in the Del Rio Border Patrol sector, first-time illegal entrants will receive a
six-to-ten day sentence if they plead guilty; contesting the charges will automatically result in at
least a thirty-day stay in detention—regardless of the outcome at trial—because the government
has the right to prepare for trial for at least thirty days. Id. at 509. Given that reality, most federal
public defenders in Del Rio advise their clients to plead guilty quickly. Id.
360. Id. at 508.
361. See id. at 509–12 (providing specific examples of sentence variations assigned to illegal
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for an eight-, twelve-, or sixteen-level prior-conviction increase can
receive a sentence ranging from a few years to a decade. 362 Of those
who are prosecuted for illegal re-entry, the average sentence is around
twenty-one months. 363
Both the exact monetary cost of Operation Streamline and the overall
cost of prosecuting illegal entry and re-entry cases remain unknown. 364
However, between detention costs and money for defense attorneys,
prosecutors, and additional immigration and court personnel, the
monetary figure exceeds well over a billion dollars per year. 365 Indeed,
the detention cost for illegal entry and re-entry cases alone is just over
one billion dollars. 366 At least one federal judge has called the costs
from prosecuting illegal entry and re-entry defendants with no criminal
history “simply mind boggling,” stating that “[t]he U.S. Attorney’s
policy of prosecuting all aliens presents a cost to the American taxpayer
at this time that is neither meritorious nor reasonable.” 367 Thus,
immigration officials are mitigating the resource problem, in part, with
massive amounts of taxpayer money.
DOJ has also diverted resources away from other types of cases along
the border, including “serious crimes, [like] gun and drug trafficking
and organized crime.” 368 The U.S. Attorney in Las Cruces, New

entrants with a criminal background).
362. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing how, depending on a defendant’s
criminal history score, his or her sentence could increase by anywhere from 51 months to 107
months under the sentencing guidelines).
363. 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 315, at tbl.50.
364. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 527 (“Streamline’s expenditures are difficult to pinpoint,
as relatively little information about the program’s costs is publicly available. However, a basic
review of the resources required to run the program suggests that its costs are likely significant.”).
365. See GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 318, at 8 (“Since there is little clear federal
oversight of Operation Streamline (OS), there is no well-documented review of the resources that
the policy consumes, financial or otherwise.”). According to one estimate, Arizona alone spends
$10 million per month. Id. at 10. In 2009, Texas spent around $320 million in detention costs
due to criminal sentencing of immigration cases in its south and western districts alone. Id.
Likewise, between 2005 and 2009, Texas spent about $1.2 billion on detention costs. Id. See In
re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he Department of Justice asked for a funding increase of $231.6 million for FY 2010 to
support its immigration enforcement along the southwest border, including Operation
Streamline.”).
366. See OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 24 tbl.3 (depicting immigrant
incarceration costs in 2011 at $1,023,615,633.60—comprised of $84,399,412.80 in illegal entry
costs and $939,216,220.80 in illegal re-entry costs).
367. See id. at 7 (quoting Order, United States v. Ordones-Soto, No. A-09-CR-590-SS (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 5, 2010)).
368. See GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 318, at 8–9 (“[Operation Streamline’s] use of
resources has a number of consequences, including a shift in focus away from more serious
violations of the law.”); Lydgate, supra note 318, at 522 (noting the decline in prosecution of
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Mexico, for example, has lamented that the increased immigration
caseload has prevented his office from being as “proactive” as they
would like to be in bringing down drug and human trafficking
organizations. 369 Likewise, at least some “white collar investigations”
have been relegated to the “back burner” to make room for
“immigration cases.” 370
The U.S. Marshals Service has also
complained that, along the border, it is “being forced to balance the
apprehension of child predators and sex offenders against the judicial
security requirements involved in handling immigration detainees.”371
This resource shift caused the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
New Mexico, Martha Vazquez, to state publicly that she worried that
law enforcement resources and detention space would be taken up by
immigration offenders rather than “robbers” and “rapists.” 372
This re-allocation of resources is troubling. For the past decade, DOJ
had used the crimes of illegal entry and re-entry to target individuals
who it believed were dangerous and likely to commit other, more
serious crimes. But while DOJ’s strategy was poorly executed, its
overall goal—protecting the public—is obviously an important function
of DOJ. By diverting resources away from prosecuting individuals for
serious crimes and toward prosecuting economic migrants, it appears
that DOJ is undermining its mission of protecting the public for the sake
of regulating immigration.
But setting aside the cost and whether the public is safer, is Operation
Streamline deterring illegal immigration? The answer appears to be no.
While there is no direct way to measure whether Operation Streamline
deters illegal immigration, there is little reason to think that its current
efforts are providing a meaningful deterrent effect. The same problems
that plagued DOJ’s efforts to deter illegal entry and re-entry in the
1950s and 1960s still exist today. First, despite the huge absolute
number of prosecutions, the chances of being prosecuted are still low.
Researchers estimate that the government currently prosecutes around
16% to 23% of those it apprehends for illegal entry or re-entry. 373
more serious crimes).
369. OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 13 (describing the U.S. Attorneys’ Office
as more “reactive” than “proactive” due to its large immigration caseload). See also id. at 17
(explaining how Streamline detracts from more serious criminal prosecutions).
370. See Williams Statement, supra note 337, at 7 (recounting a statement the then-U.S.
Attorney for Tucson made about being forced to put “white collar investigations” on the “back
burner due to the crush of immigration cases”).
371. Lydgate, supra note 318, at 524.
372. Southwest Border Courts Swamped with Immigration-Related Felony Cases, FOX NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,268961,00.html.
373. See Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, supra note 355 (estimating that
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Many others escape apprehension altogether. Second, it seems doubtful
that the threat of prosecutions can change the cost-benefit analysis for
aliens enough that a meaningful number will decide not to immigrate
here illegally. Aliens continue to come to the United States for jobs—
research shows that they can more than double their annual earnings by
working here 374—or to reunite with their families. 375 That is why many
risk their lives by crossing dangerous stretches of desert to enter the
United States and hundreds continue to die every year trying to make
the journey. 376 Others pay smugglers thousands of dollars to guide
them into the United States. 377 For non-Mexican nationals, their
journey to the United States will likely take some time, and they already
risk a lengthy stay in immigration detention. Additionally, these
individuals risk a civil penalty, in the form of being sent back to their
country of origin. If those costs do not dissuade someone from trying to
come to the United States illegally, it appears doubtful that the threat of
a sentence of a few weeks, or, in many cases, even a few years, 378
around 16% of aliens caught sneaking into the United States are prosecuted); Edwin Mora, 77
Percent of Illegals Caught on Mexican Border Were Not Prosecuted, CNSNEWS (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/77-percent-illegals-caught-mexican-border-were-not-prosecuted
(quoting Rep. John Culberson as stating that, according to DOJ data, about 22.9% of aliens
caught along the southwest border during fiscal year 2011 were prosecuted).
374. Kevin H. Fandl, Immigration Posses: U.S. Immigration Law and Local Enforcement
Practices, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 33 (2008) (“The average worker in Mexico earns $8,340 per year,
whereas the average Mexican immigrant worker in the United States earns $18,952 per year. The
difference is so great that the risk of death and deportation from crossing the border appears
reasonable. Compared to the risk of a starving family in Mexico, many Mexicans cross the
border multiple times after being caught and deported, hoping to one day work enough days in
the United States to earn money to provide for the basic necessities of their families back home.
Unfortunately the likelihood that they will die in the process is increasing, averaging one death
per day over the last four years.” (footnotes omitted)).
375. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 484 (noting that most individuals who cross the U.S.Mexico border do so “in search of work or to reunite with family in the United States”); Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of Chief
Judge Martha Vazquez, Dist. of N.M.) (“[Illegal re-entry defendants] are not terrorists, and the
vast majority of them are not violent criminals. Overwhelmingly, they are motivated by poverty
to come to the United States to work. They come from Mexico or Central American countries to
support their families or to reunite with family members who are already in the United States.”).
376. See, e.g., GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 318, at 14 (“[There had been] 419
border-crossing fatalities as of December 2009, already surpassing 2008’s 390 deaths.”);
BORDER-CROSSING DEATHS HAVE DOUBLED SINCE 1995, supra note 254, at 16 (documenting
the several hundred individuals who died attempting to enter the United States illegally each year
from 1985 to 2005); OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 16 (explaining how criminal
prosecutions and incarceration do not deter immigrants from entering the U.S.).
377. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 524–25 (noting that Operation Streamline actually
incentivizes human smuggling).
378. As noted above, substantial research indicates that increasing sentencing severity does
little to actually deter conduct. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the
certainty of apprehension is more of a deterrent than the severity of punishment). El Paso U.S.
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would convince someone not to come to the United States illegally,
assuming individuals would even be aware of the threat of criminal
prosecution.
Apart from those problems previously discussed, the way DHS and
DOJ have employed Operation Streamline provides yet another reason
to doubt that the program actually deters illegal immigration. A
deterrence strategy makes sense only if it is uniformly applied across
the entire U.S.-Mexico border. To the extent that individuals are aware
of Operation Streamline, they will know it does not exist in Southern
California and near Tucson. The rational response would be to try to
enter the United States in those areas. Indeed, given the sophistication
of alien smuggling organizations, this is likely exactly what the
organizations are doing for the aliens who hire them. Members of at
least one border community have started to refer to Operation
Streamline as a “coyote employment bill.” 379 Prosecuting a meaningful
percentage of the individuals apprehended in those two sectors,
however, is simply not possible. Both districts are already at their
breaking points in terms of the number of prosecutions. Prosecuting a
meaningful number of individuals in Southern California and Tuscon
would likely require prosecuting over 100,000 cases in those districts
every year—almost 400 cases each day during the work week 380—
which would likely require doubling the size of the entire criminal
division of DOJ, in addition to massive investments in court and
detention facilities.
Nevertheless, DHS maintains that Operation Streamline meaningfully
deters individuals from coming to the United States illegally. 381 The
basis for their claim is that apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border

Magistrate Judge Norbert Garney aptly stated: “Does it (Streamline) discourage people from
crossing the border? Of course it doesn’t. Ten to 14 days [in jail] is a small price to pay for the
opportunity to double, triple or even quadruple your income and start a better life for your
family.” OPERATION STREAMLINE, supra note 298, at 16 (citing Lauren Gambino, Program
Prosecutes Illegal Immigrants Before Deporting Them, NEWS21, http://asu.news21.com/
2010/prosecuting-illegal-immigrants/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012)).
379. Lydgate, supra note 318, at 525 (citing Interview with Robert Kinney, Supervisory
Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender, Las Cruces, N.M. (Mar. 25, 2009)).
380. See 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 93 tbl.35
(documenting that around 150,000 aliens were apprehended in the San Diego and El Centro
California Border Patrol sectors in 2009, while around 250,000 aliens were apprehended in the
Tucson, Arizona Border Patrol sector).
381. See Williams Statement, supra note 337, at 17–18 (raising concern over the claimed
success of Operation Streamline); In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of
Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, pt. A (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the immediate impact Operation Streamline has
had in deterring illegal border entries and increasing apprehension of drug smugglers).
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have slowly decreased since Operation Streamline began in 2005.382
According to DHS, the decrease in apprehensions indicates a decrease
in illegal border-crossing attempts, which is being caused by the threat
of prosecution. 383
Figures 5 and 6, below, compare the combined illegal entry and reentry convictions and deportable aliens apprehended between 1991 and
2010, respectively.
FIGURE 5

Combined Illegal Entry and Re-entry Prosecutions
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FIGURE 6

Deportable Aliens Apprehended
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382. In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d at pt. A.
383. Id.
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DHS, however, has no data to establish that prosecuting more illegal
entry and re-entry cases is the cause in this drop in illegal immigration.
There are many reasons to doubt such a link, beyond the reasons given
above. For instance, apprehensions have been in decline since 2000,
well before Operation Streamline began. 384 Moreover, apprehensions
have declined in the areas that have not instituted Operation Streamline,
including Southern California. 385 Studies have also indicated that, to
the extent that there are fewer individuals coming to the United States
illegally, the decrease has been caused by the economic decline of the
United States over the past decade; the unemployment rate, for
example, has increased dramatically since 2000. 386 Indeed, border
apprehensions have largely tracked the U.S. job market since 1991. 387
DHS’s claim about the success of the prosecution aspects of Operation
Streamline also implicitly downplays its other, non-prosecution-related
attempts to reduce illegal immigration, particularly its efforts over the
previous twenty years to dramatically escalate the presence of Border
Patrol agents along the U.S.-Mexico border. In short, there is simply no
evidence that the government is meaningfully deterring illegal
immigration by prosecuting illegal entry and re-entry cases.
It should not be surprising that a lack of evidence concerning the
deterrent effect of prosecuting a larger number of cases has not ended
Operation Streamline. As noted earlier, if, as Peter Andreas argues, the
primary push for border enforcement is the symbolic effect of the
government’s efforts, evidence about deterrence is ultimately beside the
point. 388 But unlike earlier years in which the government’s symbolic
efforts usually resulted in relatively few prosecutions, its current
symbolic effort has come with enormous costs.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the historical arc of the government’s prosecution of
illegal entry and re-entry cases, a common theme that runs through the
different periods is ineffective policy—a mismatch between strategy
384. See Williams Statement, supra note 337, at 17–18; 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 91 tbl.33 (documenting the number of deportable aliens located
between 1925 to 2009).
385. See Williams Statement, supra note 337, at 18–19 (noting the decrease in deportable
aliens located in all areas, not just the areas in which Operation Streamline was implemented).
386. See Lydgate, supra note 318, at 517 (noting the impossibility of isolating Operation
Streamline’s success when considering other DHS enforcement strategies that have also been
enacted).
387. Id.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91 (describing the change in penalty for first-time
illegal entrants).
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and the articulated goals. This mismatch is most pronounced with the
present policy. Nevertheless, although current policy has been a
catastrophic failure and structural reform is desperately needed, little
momentum for change exists. Indeed, when policymakers discuss
comprehensive immigration reform, discussion about changing the way
in which the federal criminal justice system is employed is invariably
left out of the conversation. There has been no mention, for example, of
reducing the amount of money given to DOJ to prosecute such cases,
nor has there been any discussion of whether the illegal entry and reentry statutes themselves should be amended to re-focus on a narrower
subset of individuals—or perhaps even be repealed.
If anything, the coming years will likely see an increase in support
for prosecutions because, by prosecuting more aliens who have no prior
criminal history, DOJ is, in effect, creating more “criminal aliens.”
Thus, in the ensuing years, as some of these individuals are reapprehended, a higher percentage of apprehended aliens will be
classified as “criminals,” thereby providing justification for politicians
to claim that prosecutions are necessary to protect the public from these
dangerous individuals. In other words, the dangerousness of individuals
who illegally enter and re-enter will not change—only the label to
describe them will. Indeed, this phenomenon is already happening. In
March 2011, the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a
study on “criminal aliens” at the request of Representative Steve King,
an outspoken critic of illegal immigration. 389 The study documented
that the federal government, over the previous five years, had spent an
increasingly large amount of money on incarcerating criminal aliens—
now well over a billion dollars a year—and that apprehending criminal
aliens increased 85% from 2007 to 2010. 390 The study also uncovered
the increasing number of criminal aliens in federal prison. 391 Nowhere
in the study, however, is Operation Streamline discussed. Soon after
the its release, King touted the report as proof that more needed to be
done to combat illegal immigration from Mexico. 392 This is likely only
the beginning of this particular line of argument, an argument that
appears to be winning over U.S. voters.

389. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMATION ON
INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS (Mar. 2011).
390. Id. at 16–17, 35.
391. Id.
392. See Press Release, Congressman Steve King, Criminal Aliens Increasingly Burden
Americans (April 21, 2011), available at http://steveking.house.gov/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=4164&Itemid=300100 (suggesting that the U.S. needs to secure the
southern border with “a fence, a wall, and a fence”).
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This last point is perhaps the most telling. It is easy to dismiss the
government’s strategy in pursuing illegal entry and re-entry cases as
typical bureaucratic ineffectiveness. But the government’s efforts have
been ineffective only when judged against their articulated goals of
deterrence and protecting the public. As a public relations effort—as
symbolic enforcement—it is not as clear that the efforts have been
ineffective.
Despite the grim outlook, the current climate of reform and the
growing chorus of complaints about Operation Streamline present a
unique opportunity to persuade relevant stakeholders to come up with a
coherent, cost-effective, and realistic illegal entry and re-entry policy
for the first time in this nation’s history. Thus, it is possible that by
pursuing such a self-destructive policy, immigration officials will force
the relevant actors to take a much more critical look at the use of the
criminal justice system in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws along
the U.S.-Mexico border.

